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Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc.
15-777
Ruling Below: Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Plaintiff Apple sued Defendant Samsung alleging that the South Korean tech company infringed
on Apple’s patented iPhone designs. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, entered judgement against Samsung.
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment awarding Apple
the “total profits” of the Samsung smartphone devices named in the lawsuit. However, the court
vacated the district court's judgment that the competitors committed trade dress infringement and
remanded the case.
Question Presented: Whether, where a design patent is applied to only a component of a
product, an award of infringer’s profits should be limited to those profits attributable to the
component.

APPLE INC., a California corporation
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
A Korean corporation,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
A New York corporation,
SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC
A Delaware limited liability company
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided on May 18, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PROST, Chief Judge.

trade dresses in various combinations and
awarded over $1 billion in damages.

Background
Apple sued Samsung in April 2011. On
August 24, 2012, the first jury reached a
verdict that numerous Samsung smartphones
infringed and diluted Apple's patents and

The infringed design patents are U.S. Design
Patent Nos. D618,677 ("D'677 patent"),
D593,087 ("D'087"), and D604,305
("D'305"), which claim certain design
elements embodied in Apple's iPhone. The
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infringed utility patents are U.S. Patent Nos.
7,469,381 ("'381 patent"), 7,844,915 ("915
patent"), and 7,864,163 ("163 patent), which
claim certain features in the iPhone's user
interface. The diluted trade dresses are
Trademark Registration No. 3,470,983 ("'983
trade dress") and an unregistered trade dress
defined in terms of certain elements in the
configuration of the iPhone.
Following the first jury trial, the district court
upheld the jury's infringement, dilution, and
validity findings over Samsung's post-trial
motion. The district court also upheld
$639,403,248 in damages, but ordered a
partial retrial on the remainder of the
damages because they had been awarded for
a period when Samsung lacked notice of
some of the asserted patents. The jury in the
partial retrial on damages awarded Apple
$290,456,793, which the district court upheld
over Samsung's second post-trial motion. On
March 6, 2014, the district court entered a
final judgment in favor of Apple, and
Samsung filed a notice of appeal. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
Discussion
We review the denial of Samsung's post-trial
motions under the Ninth Circuit's procedural
standards. The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo
a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law. "The test is whether the evidence,
construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, permits only one
reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is
contrary to that of the jury."
The Ninth Circuit reviews a denial of a
motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. "In evaluating jury instructions,
prejudicial error results when, looking to the

instructions as a whole, the substance of the
applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly
covered." The Ninth Circuit orders a new trial
based on jury instruction error only if the
error was prejudicial. A motion for a new trial
based on insufficiency of evidence may be
granted "only if the verdict is against the
great weight of the evidence, or it is quite
clear that the jury has reached a seriously
erroneous result."
Samsung appeals numerous legal and
evidentiary bases for the liability findings
and damages awards in the three categories
of intellectual property asserted by Apple:
trade dresses, design patents, and utility
patents. We address each category in turn.
I. Trade Dresses
The jury found Samsung liable for the likely
dilution of Apple's iPhone trade dresses
under the Lanham Act. When reviewing
Lanham Act claims, we look to the law of the
regional circuit where the district court sits.
We therefore apply Ninth Circuit law.
The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]rade
dress is the totality of elements in which a
product or service is packaged or presented."
The essential purpose of a trade dress is the
same as that of a trademarked word: to
identify the source of the product. In this
respect, "protection for trade dress exists to
promote competition."
The protection for source identification,
however, must be balanced against "a
fundamental right to compete through
imitation of a competitor's product . . . ." This
"right can only be temporarily denied by the
patent or copyright laws." In contrast,
trademark law allows for a perpetual
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monopoly and its use in the protection of
"physical details and design of a product"
must be limited to those that are
"nonfunctional." Thus, it is necessary for us
to determine first whether Apple's asserted
trade dresses, claiming elements from its
iPhone product, are nonfunctional and
therefore protectable.
"In general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article." "A product feature
need only have some utilitarian advantage to
be considered functional." A trade dress,
taken as a whole, is functional if it is "in its
particular shape because it works better in
this shape."
"[C]ourts have noted that it is, and should be,
more difficult to claim product configuration
trade dress than other forms of trade dress."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit have repeatedly found product
configuration trade dresses functional and
therefore non-protectable.
Moreover, federal trademark registrations
have been found insufficient to save product
configuration trade dresses from conclusions
of functionality. The Ninth Circuit has even
reversed a jury verdict of non-functionality of
a product configuration trade dress. Apple
conceded during oral argument that it had not
cited a single Ninth Circuit case that found a
product configuration trade dress to be nonfunctional.
The Ninth Circuit's high bar for nonfunctionality frames our review of the two
iPhone trade dresses on appeal. While the
parties argue without distinguishing the two
trade dresses, the unregistered trade dress and

the registered '983 trade dress claim different
details and are afforded different evidentiary
presumptions under the Lanham Act. We
analyze the two trade dresses separately
below.
A. Unregistered Trade Dress
Apple claims elements from its iPhone 3G
and 3GS products to define the asserted
unregistered trade dress:


a rectangular product with four
evenly rounded corners;



a flat, clear surface covering the front
of the product;



a display screen under the clear
surface;



substantial black borders above and
below the display screen and
narrower black borders on either side
of the screen; and



when the device is on, a row of small
dots on the display screen, a matrix of
colorful square icons with evenly
rounded corners within the display
screen, and an unchanging bottom
dock of colorful square icons with
evenly rounded corners set off from
the display's other icons.

As this trade dress is not registered on the
principal federal trademark register, Apple
"has the burden of proving that the claimed
trade dress, taken as a whole, is not functional
. . . ."
Apple argues that the unregistered trade dress
is nonfunctional under each of the Disc Golf
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factors that the Ninth Circuit uses to analyze
functionality: "(1) whether the design yields
a utilitarian advantage, (2) whether
alternative designs are available, (3) whether
advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of
the design, and (4) whether the particular
design results from a comparatively simple or
inexpensive method of manufacture."
However, the Supreme Court has more
recently held that "a feature is also functional
. . . when it affects the cost or quality of the
device." The Supreme Court's holding was
recognized by the Ninth Circuit as "short
circuiting some of the Disc Golf factors."
Nevertheless, we explore Apple's contentions
on each of the Disc Golf factors and conclude
that there was insufficient evidence to
support a jury finding in favor of
nonfunctionality on any factor.
1. Utilitarian Advantage
Apple argues that "the iPhone's physical
design did not 'contribute unusually . . . to the
usability' of the device." Apple further
contends that the unregistered trade dress was
"developed . . . not for 'superior
performance.'" Neither "unusual usability"
nor "superior performance," however, is the
standard used by the Ninth Circuit to
determine whether there is any utilitarian
advantage. The Ninth Circuit "has never held,
as [plaintiff] suggests, that the product
feature must provide superior utilitarian
advantages. To the contrary, [the Ninth
Circuit] has suggested that in order to
establish nonfunctionality the party with the
burden must demonstrate that the product
feature serves no purpose other than
identification."
The requirement that the unregistered trade
dress "serves no purpose other than

identification" cannot be reasonably inferred
from the evidence. Apple emphasizes a single
aspect of its design, beauty, to imply the lack
of other advantages. But the evidence showed
that the iPhone's design pursued more than
just beauty. Specifically, Apple's executive
testified that the theme for the design of the
iPhone was:
“to create a new breakthrough design
for a phone that was beautiful and
simple and easy to use and created a
beautiful, smooth surface that had a
touchscreen and went right to the rim
with the bezel around it and looking
for a look that we found was beautiful
and easy to use and appealing.”
Moreover, Samsung cites extensive evidence
in the record that showed the usability
function of every single element in the
unregistered trade dress. For example,
rounded corners improve "pocketability" and
"durability"
and
rectangular
shape
maximizes the display that can be
accommodated. A flat clear surface on the
front of the phone facilitates touch operation
by fingers over a large display. The bezel
protects the glass from impact when the
phone is dropped. The borders around the
display are sized to accommodate other
components while minimizing the overall
product dimensions. The row of dots in the
user interface indicates multiple pages of
application screens that are available. The
icons allow users to differentiate the
applications available to the users and the
bottom dock of unchanging icons allows for
quick access to the most commonly used
applications. Apple rebuts none of this
evidence.
Apple conceded during oral argument that its
trade dress "improved the quality [of the
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iPhone] in some respects." It is thus clear that
the unregistered trade dress has a utilitarian
advantage.
2. Alternative Designs
The next factor requires that purported
alternative designs "offer exactly the same
features" as the asserted trade dress in order
to show non-functionality. A manufacturer
"does not have rights under trade dress law to
compel its competitors to resort to alternative
designs which have a different set of
advantages and disadvantages."
Apple, while asserting that there were
"numerous alternative designs," fails to show
that any of these alternatives offered exactly
the same features as the asserted trade dress.
Apple simply catalogs the mere existence of
other design possibilities embodied in
rejected iPhone prototypes and other
manufacturers' smartphones. The "mere
existence" of other designs, however, does
not prove that the unregistered trade dress is
non-functional.
3. Advertising of Utilitarian Advantages
"If a seller advertises the utilitarian
advantages of a particular feature, this
constitutes strong evidence of functionality."
An "inference" of a product feature's utility in
the plaintiff's advertisement is enough to
weigh in favor of functionality of a trade
dress encompassing that feature.
Apple argues that its advertising was "[f]ar
from touting any utilitarian advantage of the
iPhone design . . . ." Apple relies on its
executive's testimony that an iPhone
advertisement, portraying "the distinctive
design very clearly," was based on Apple's

"product as hero" approach. The "product as
hero" approach refers to Apple's stylistic
choice of making "the product the biggest,
clearest, most obvious thing in [its]
advertisements, often at the expense of
anything else around it, to remove all the
other elements of communication so [the
viewer]
see[s]
the
product
most
predominantly in the marketing."
Apple's arguments focusing on its stylistic
choice, however, fail to address the substance
of its advertisements. The substance of the
iPhone advertisement relied upon by Apple
gave viewers "the ability to see a bit about
how it might work," for example, "how
flicking and scrolling and tapping and all
these multitouch ideas simply [sic]." Another
advertisement cited by Apple similarly
displayed the message, "[t]ouching is
believing," under a picture showing a user's
hand interacting with the graphical user
interface of an iPhone. Apple fails to show
that, on the substance, these demonstrations
of the user interface on iPhone's touch screen
involved the elements claimed in Apple's
unregistered trade dress and why they were
not touting the utilitarian advantage of the
unregistered trade dress.
4. Method of Manufacture
The fourth factor considers whether a
functional benefit in the asserted trade dress
arises from "economies in manufacture or
use," such as being "relatively simple or
inexpensive to manufacture."
Apple contends that "[t]he iPhone design did
not result from a 'comparatively simple or
inexpensive method of manufacture'"
because Apple experienced manufacturing
challenges.
Apple's
manufacturing
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challenges, however, resulted from the
durability considerations for the iPhone and
not from the design of the unregistered trade
dress. According to Apple's witnesses,
difficulties resulted from its choices of
materials in using "hardened steel"; "very
high, high grade of steel"; and, "glass that
was not breakable enough, scratch resistant
enough." These materials were chosen, for
example, for the iPhone to survive a drop:
If you drop this, you don't have to worry
about the ground hitting the glass. You
have to worry about the band of steel
surrounding the glass hitting the glass. . .
. In order to, to make it work, we had to
use very high, high grade of steel because
we couldn't have it sort of deflecting into
the glass.
The durability advantages that resulted from
the manufacturing challenges, however, are
outside the scope of what Apple defines as its
unregistered trade dress. For the design
elements that comprise Apple's unregistered
trade dress, Apple points to no evidence in
the record to show they were not relatively
simple or inexpensive to manufacture.
In sum, Apple has failed to show that there
was substantial evidence in the record to
support a jury finding in favor of nonfunctionality for the unregistered trade dress
on any of the Disc Golf factors. Apple fails to
rebut the evidence that the elements in the
unregistered trade dress serve the functional
purpose of improving usability. Rather,
Apple focuses on the "beauty" of its design,
even though Apple pursued both "beauty"
and functionality in the design of the iPhone.
We therefore reverse the district court's
denial of Samsung's motion for judgment as
a matter of law that the unregistered trade

dress is functional and therefore not
protectable.
B. The Registered '983 Trade Dress
In contrast to the unregistered trade dress, the
'983 trade dress is a federally registered
trademark. The federal trademark registration
provides "prima facie evidence" of nonfunctionality. Once this presumption is
overcome, the registration loses its legal
significance on the issue of functionality.
The '983 trade dress claims the design details
in each of the sixteen icons on the iPhone's
home screen framed by the iPhone's roundedrectangular shape with silver edges and a
black background:
The first icon depicts the letters
"SMS" in green inside a white
speech bubble on a green
background;
...
the seventh icon depicts a map
with yellow and orange roads, a pin
with a red head, and a redand-blue
road sign with the numeral "280" in
white;
...
the sixteenth icon depicts the
distinctive
configuration
of
applicant's media player device in
white over an orange background.
'983 trade dress (omitting thirteen other icon
design details for brevity).
It is clear that individual elements claimed by
the '983 trade dress are functional. For
example, there is no dispute that the claimed
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details such as "the seventh icon depicts a
map with yellow and orange roads, a pin with
a red head, and a red-and-blue road sign with
the numeral '280' in white" are functional.
Apple's user interface expert testified on how
icon designs promote usability. This expert
agreed that "the whole point of an icon on a
smartphone is to communicate to the
consumer using that product, that if they hit
that icon, certain functionality will occur on
the phone." The expert further explained that
icons are "[v]isual shorthand for something"
and that "rectangular containers" for icons
provide "more real estate" to accommodate
the icon design. Apple rebuts none of this
evidence.
Apple contends instead that Samsung
improperly disaggregates the '983 trade dress
into individual elements to argue
functionality. But Apple fails to explain how
the total combination of the sixteen icon
designs in the context of iPhone's screendominated rounded-rectangular shape—all
part of the iPhone's "easy to use" design
theme—somehow negates the undisputed
usability function of the individual elements.
Apple's own brief even relies on its expert's
testimony about the "instant recognizability
due to highly intuitive icon usage" on "the
home screen of the iPhone." Apple's expert
was discussing an analysis of the iPhone's
overall combination of icon designs that
allowed a user to recognize quickly particular
applications to use.
The iPhone's usability advantage from the
combination of its icon designs shows that
the '983 trade dress viewed as a whole "is
nothing other than the assemblage of
functional parts . . . ." The undisputed facts
thus demonstrate the functionality of the '983
trade dress. "In the face of sufficient and

undisputed facts demonstrating functionality,
as in our case, the registration loses its
evidentiary significance."
The burden thus shifts back to Apple. But
Apple offers no analysis of the icon designs
claimed by the '983 trade dress. Rather,
Apple argues generically for its two trade
dresses without distinction under the Disc
Golf factors. Among Apple's lengthy
citations to the record, we can find only two
pieces of information that involve icon
designs. One is Apple's user interface expert
discussing other possible icon designs. The
other is a citation to a print iPhone
advertisement that included the icon designs
claimed in the '983 trade dress. These two
citations, viewed in the most favorable light
to Apple, would be relevant to only two of the
Disc Golf factors: "alternative design" and
"advertising." But the cited evidence suffers
from the same defects as discussed in
subsections I.A.2 and I.A.3. Specifically, the
expert's discussion of other icon design
possibilities does not show that the other
design possibilities "offer[ed] exactly the
same features" as the '983 trade dress. The
print iPhone advertisement also fails to
establish that, on the substance, it was not
touting the utilitarian advantage of the '983
trade dress. The evidence cited by Apple
therefore does not show the non-functionality
of the '983 trade dress.
In sum, the undisputed evidence shows the
functionality of the registered '983 trade dress
and shifts the burden of proving nonfunctionality back to Apple. Apple, however,
has failed to show that there was substantial
evidence in the record to support a jury
finding in favor of non-functionality for the
'983 trade dress on any of the Disc Golf
factors. We therefore reverse the district
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court's denial of Samsung's motion for
judgment as a matter of law that the '983 trade
dress is functional and therefore not
protectable.
Because we conclude that the jury's findings
of nonfunctionality of the asserted trade
dresses were not supported by substantial
evidence, we do not reach Samsung's
arguments on the fame and likely dilution of
the asserted trade dresses, the Patent Clause
of the Constitution, or the dilution damages.
II. Design Patents
The design patents on appeal claim certain
design elements embodied in the iPhone. The
focuses on design elements on the front face
of the iPhone.
Samsung contends that it should not have
been found liable for infringement of the
asserted design patents because any
similarity was limited to the basic or
functional elements in the design patents.
Moreover, according to Samsung, there was
no evidence of actual deception of consumers
and that the differences between the accused
smartphones and the asserted design patents
should have been clear if prior art designs
were properly considered. Samsung raises
these three issues—functionality, actual
deception, and comparison to prior art—in
the context of the jury instructions and the
sufficiency of evidence to support the
infringement verdict. Finally, Samsung
argues that the district court legally erred in
allowing the jury to award as damages
Samsung's entire profits on its infringing
smartphones. We do not find any of these
challenges persuasive as discussed below.
A. Infringement

1. Jury Instructions
a. Functional Aspects in the Asserted Design
Patents
"Where a design contains both functional and
nonfunctional elements, the scope of the
claim must be construed in order to identify
the non-functional aspects of the design as
shown in the patent." Samsung contends that
the district court erred in failing to exclude
the functional aspects of the design patents
either in the claim construction or elsewhere
in the infringement jury instructions.
Specifically, Samsung contends that the
district court should have excluded elements
that are "'dictated by their functional
purpose,' or cover the 'structural . . . aspects
of the article.'" Such elements, according to
Samsung, should be "ignored" in their
entirety from the design patent claim scope.
For example, Samsung contends that
rectangular form and rounded corners are
among such elements that should be ignored
in the infringement analysis.
Our case law does not support Samsung's
position. In Richardson, the design patent at
issue depicted a multifunction tool with
numerous components that were "dictated by
their functional purpose." But the claim
construction in Richardson did not exclude
those components in their entirety. Rather,
the claim construction included the
ornamental aspects of those components:
"the standard shape of the hammer-head, the
diamond-shaped flare of the crow-bar and the
top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the
orientation of the crow-bar relative to the
head of the tool, and the plain, undecorated
handle." That construction was affirmed on
appeal. As such, the language "dictated by
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their functional purpose" in Richardson was
only a description of the facts there; it did not
establish a rule to eliminate entire elements
from the claim scope as Samsung argues.
Our case law likewise does not support
Samsung's proposed rule of eliminating any
"structural" aspect from the claim scope.
Samsung arrives at its proposed rule by
selecting a few words from the following
statement in Lee: "[d]esign patents do not and
cannot include claims to the structural or
functional aspects of the article . . . ." But that
statement addressed design patent validity. It
did not specify a rule, as Samsung represents,
to eliminate elements from the claim scope of
a valid patent in analyzing infringement.
More directly applicable to the claim scope
issue at hand, Lee stated elsewhere that "it is
the non-functional, design aspects that are
pertinent to determinations of infringement."
That principle was properly reflected in this
case in the district court's construction of the
design patents as claiming only "the
ornamental design" as shown in the patent
figures. Samsung has not persuasively shown
how the district court's claim constructions
were legally erroneous under Lee or
Richardson.
Samsung asserted alternatively during oral
argument that the jury should have been
instructed to compare the accused Samsung
smartphones to the "overall ornamental
appearance" of a patented design, instead of
simply "the overall appearance" as the district
court provided. According to Samsung,
"crucially, what's missing there is the word
'ornamental.'" But jury instructions are
reviewed "as a whole" to determine whether
"the substance of the applicable law was [not]
fairly and correctly covered" such that the

alleged error was prejudicial. The jury
instructions, as a whole, already limited the
scope of the asserted design patents to the
"ornamental" elements through the claim
constructions as discussed earlier: the design
patents were each construed as claiming "the
ornamental design" as shown in the patent
figures. As such, Samsung has failed to show
prejudicial error in the jury instructions as a
whole that would warrant a new trial.
b. Actual Deception and Role of Prior Art
Samsung further contends that the
infringement instruction was erroneous for
stating that actual deception was not required,
and for providing guidelines in considering
prior art. A design patent is infringed if an
ordinary observer would have been deceived:
"if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving
such attention as a purchaser usually gives,
two designs are substantially the same, if the
resemblance is such as to deceive such an
observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one
patented is infringed by the other." Moreover,
an infringement analysis must include a
comparison of the asserted design against the
prior art: "[i]f the accused design has copied
a particular feature of the claimed design that
departs conspicuously from the prior art, the
accused design is naturally more likely to be
regarded as deceptively similar to the
claimed design, and thus infringing."
These holdings from Gorham and Egyptian
Goddess were reflected in the infringement
instruction here, and Samsung does not
contend otherwise. Samsung argues instead
that the portions in the infringement
instruction highlighted below made the jury
consider a lack of actual deception irrelevant
and led the jury to disregard the prior art:
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“Two designs are substantially the
same if, in the eye of an ordinary
observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser
usually
gives,
the
resemblance between the two designs
is such as to deceive such an observer,
inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other. You do
not need, however, to find that any
purchasers actually were deceived or
confused by the appearance of the
accused Samsung products. . . .
This determination of whether two
designs are substantially the same
will benefit from comparing the two
designs with prior art. You must
familiarize yourself with the prior art
admitted at trial in making your
determination of whether there has
been direct infringement.
You may find the following
guidelines helpful to your analysis . .
. .”
We conclude instead that the jury instruction
simply clarified that actual deception was not
required, which is an accurate reflection of
the analysis in Gorham.
We also conclude that the jury instruction
expressly required that each juror "must"
consider the prior art admitted at trial. The
jury instruction's guidelines did not reduce
the entire prior art analysis to a mere option
as Samsung contends.
Samsung again has failed to show that "when,
looking to the instructions as a whole, the
substance of the applicable law was [not]
fairly and correctly covered."
2. Supporting Evidence

Samsung contends that the infringement
verdict was not supported by substantial
evidence. Samsung's contentions, however,
are premised on the same issues—
functionality,
actual
deception,
and
comparison to prior art—it raises in the
context of the jury instructions.
Having rejected the jury instruction
challenges, we likewise find Samsung's
parallel substantial evidence complaints
unpersuasive. Apple's witnesses provided
sufficient testimonies to allow the jury to
account for any functional aspects in the
asserted design patents. Additionally, the
witnesses testified on the similar overall
visual impressions of the accused products to
the asserted design patents such that an
ordinary observer would likely be deceived.
Apple's experts also testified about the
differences between the asserted patents and
both the prior art and other competing
designs. The jury could have reasonably
relied on the evidence in the record to reach
its infringement verdict.
3. Preclusion of Evidence
Samsung also appeals the district court's
preclusion of testimony on Samsung's
independent development of its F700 phone
that pre-dated the iPhone to rebut an
allegation of copying. The evidence on the
F700 was previously excluded as a prior art
reference under a Rule 37 sanction due to
Samsung's failure to timely disclose the
evidence during discovery, which Samsung
does not challenge.
The district court found that Samsung's
witness did not design any of the accused
devices and was unaware that any of the
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accused devices was based on the F700. The
district court thus determined that the
proffered testimony of Samsung's witness
would have limited probative value on the
question of whether Samsung copied any of
Apple's design patents because she lacked
first-hand knowledge relevant to the
underlying issue. As a result, the district court
concluded that the limited probative value of
the testimony was outweighed by the
likelihood that it would be considered by the
jury for the prohibited purpose under the
earlier Rule 37 sanction. We find that the
district court acted within its discretion in
precluding Samsung's proffered testimony to
rebut an allegation of copying.
We conclude that there was no prejudicial
legal error in the infringement jury
instructions on the three issues that Samsung
raises: functionality, actual deception, and
comparison to prior art. We further conclude
that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Samsung's evidence
of independent development and that there
was substantial evidence to support the jury's
infringement findings. We therefore affirm
the district court's denial of Samsung's
motion for judgment as a matter of law on
design patent infringement and Samsung's
alternative motion for a new trial.
B. Damages
Finally, with regard to the design patents,
Samsung argues that the district court legally
erred in allowing the jury to award Samsung's
entire profits on its infringing smartphones as
damages. The damages, according to
Samsung, should have been limited to the
profit attributable to the infringement
because of "basic causation principles . . . ."
Samsung contends that "Apple failed to

establish that infringement of its limited
design patents . . . caused any Samsung sales
or profits." Samsung further contends that
consumers chose Samsung based on a host of
other factors.
These "causation" arguments, however,
advocate
the
same
"apportionment"
requirement that Congress rejected. The
provisions in the Act of 1887 on design patent
infringement damages were subsequently
codified in Section 289 of Title 35.
Section 289 now provides:
“Whoever during the term of a
patent for a design, without
license of the owner, (1) applies
the patented design, or any
colorable imitation thereof, to any
article of manufacture for the
purpose of sale, or (2) sells or
exposes for sale any article of
manufacture to which such design
or colorable imitation has been
applied shall be liable to the
owner to the extent of his total
profit, but not less than $250,
recoverable in any United States
district court having jurisdiction
of the parties.
Nothing in this section shall
prevent, lessen, or impeach any
other remedy which an owner of
an infringed patent has under the
provisions of this title, but he shall
not twice recover the profit made
from the infringement.”
35 U.S.C. § 289. In reciting that an infringer
"shall be liable to the owner to the extent of
[the infringer's] total profit," Section 289
explicitly authorizes the award of total profit
from the article of manufacture bearing the
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patented [1002] design.1Link to the text of
the note Several other courts also concluded
that Section 289 authorizes such award of
total profit. The clear statutory language
prevents us from adopting a "causation" rule
as Samsung urges.
Samsung
continues
its
quest
for
apportionment by arguing, alternatively, that
the profits awarded should have been limited
to the infringing "article of manufacture," not
the entire infringing product. Samsung
argues for limiting the profits awarded to "the
portion of the product as sold that
incorporates or embodies the subject matter
of the patent." Samsung contends that the
Second Circuit had "allowed an award of
infringer's profits from the patented design of
a piano case but not from the sale of the entire
piano . . . .” These Second Circuit opinions,
however, addressed a factual situation where
"[a] purchaser desiring a piano of a particular
manufacturer may have the piano placed in
any one of several cases dealt in by the
maker." That factual situation occurred in the
context of the commercial practice in 1915 in
which ordinary purchasers regarded a piano
and a piano case as distinct articles of
manufacture. The facts at hand are different.
The innards of Samsung's smartphones were
not sold separately from their shells as
distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary
purchasers. We thus do not agree with
Samsung that these Second Circuit cases
required the district court to limit the
damages for design patent infringement in
this case.
We agree with the district court that there was
no legal error in the jury instruction on the
design patent damages. Samsung does not
argue a lack of substantial evidence to
support the damages awards under the district

court's jury instruction. We therefore affirm
the damages awarded for design patent
infringements.
III. Utility Patents
Finally, Samsung challenges the validity of
claim 50 of the ‘163 patent and claim 8 of the
‘915 patent. Samsung also challenges the
damages awarded for utility patent
infringement.
A. Validity
1. Indefiniteness of Claim 50 of the ‘163
patent
Claim 50 of the ‘163 patent relates to a user
interface feature in which a user's double
tapping on a portion of an electronic
document causes the portion to be enlarged
and "substantially centered" on the display.
‘163 patent, claim 50. Samsung contends that
claim 50 is indefinite because the ‘163 patent
provides "no objective standard to measure
the scope of the term 'substantially centered.'"
Samsung's complaint about a lack of an
"objective standard [of] measure" is seeking
a level of precision that exceeds the
definiteness required of valid patents. "The
definiteness requirement . . . mandates
clarity, while recognizing that absolute
precision is unattainable." Given this
recognition, "a patent is invalid for
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention."
Samsung, however, points to no evidence
showing that skilled artisans would find the
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element "substantially centered" as lacking
reasonable certainty in its scope. In contrast,
Apple's expert explained that the "padding"
allowed in the ‘163 patent provides skilled
artisans with enough information to
understand what "substantially centered"
means in the patent. Apple's expert cites a
discussion in the specification of an
embodiment referring to the figure
reproduced below where the enlarged portion
of the document is essentially centered
except for "a predefined amount of padding
along the sides of the display."
Apple thus presented evidence to show that
skilled artisans would interpret "substantially
centered" in the ‘163 patent to mean
essentially centered except for a marginal
spacing to accommodate ancillary graphical
user interface elements. We are not
persuaded by Samsung's attempt to discredit
this expert testimony. We therefore agree
with the district court that Samsung failed to
carry its burden in challenging the validity of
claim 50 of the ‘163 patent for indefiniteness.
2. Anticipation of Claim 8 of the ‘915 Patent
Claim 8 of the ‘915 patent describes a
computer-based method for distinguishing
between scrolling and gesture (such as
zooming) operations on a touch screen.
The dispute centers on whether a prior art
reference, the Nomura patent application,
taught the "event object" element in claim 8.
The claim recites "event object" in the
context such as: "creating an event object in
response to the user input; determining
whether the event object invokes a scroll or
gesture operation . . . ." Samsung contends
that the "movement history" in Nomura

inherently disclosed the "event object" in
claim 8 based on the opinion of its expert.
Apple, however, rebuts with its own expert
testimony. Apple's expert explained that
"event objects" in claim 8 refers to a
particular "programming construct[]" and
that there were many potential programming
alternatives that Nomura could have used to
implement the "movement history" it
disclosed. According to the explanation by
Apple's expert, Nomura did not inherently
disclose the claimed "event object." We find
that a reasonable jury could have credited the
testimony of Apple's expert over Samsung's
expert. Thus, we agree with the district court
that there was substantial evidence to support
the jury's finding that claim 8 of the ‘915
patent was not anticipated.
B. Damages
Apple advanced at trial both lost profits and
reasonable royalty damages theories. The
jury determined that for certain Samsung
phones found to infringe the ‘915 patent, no
reasonable non-infringing alternative was
available, and thus lost profits was an
appropriate measure of damages. For the
other Samsung phones found to infringe
Apple's utility patents-in-suit, the jury
determined that an award of lost profits was
not supported, and thus awarded Apple a
reasonable
royalty
for
Samsung's
infringement.
1. Lost Profits for Infringement of the ‘915
Patent
"To recover lost profits, the patent owner
must show causation in fact, establishing that
but for the infringement, he would have made
additional profits." The patentee must "take[]
into account any alternatives available to the
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infringer." "[M]arket sales of an acceptable
noninfringing substitute often suffice alone to
defeat a case for lost profits."
Samsung argues that lost profits should not
have been awarded because the evidence
showed the existence of non-infringing
substitutes. Specifically, Samsung contends
that two Samsung phones, found to have not
infringed the ‘915 patent, should have been
considered by the jury as non-infringing
substitutes. Samsung further asserts that
Apple failed to prove consumer preference of
the '915 patent's technology over a
purportedly comparable feature available in
the two non-infringing Samsung phones.
However, "the '[m]ere existence of a
competing device does not make that device
an acceptable substitute.'" The mere
existence of noninfringing phones is all
Samsung is relying on to attack the jury's
verdict. For example, Samsung points to no
evidence to support its assertion that the two
noninfringing phones included a feature
comparable to the one claimed in the '915
patent.
In contrast, there was substantial evidence to
support the jury's refusal to consider the two
phones asserted by Samsung as noninfringing substitutes. Of these two phones,
one had significantly different features, such
as a slide-out physical keyboard in
combination with a small, low-resolution
screen. And the other phone was never sold
by a U.S. carrier. The jury could have
reasonably found that these two Samsung
phones were not acceptable alternatives.
Samsung's unsupported assertion to the
contrary fails to show a lack of substantial
evidence supporting the awards of lost
profits.

2. Reasonable Royalty
Samsung argues that Apple's expert in the
damages retrial, Ms. Davis, offered only a
cursory explanation of how she arrived at the
royalty rates she calculated based on the
Georgia-Pacific factors. Samsung complains
specifically about Ms. Davis's testimony that
the evidence of demand from her lost profits
analysis was "also relevant to the
determination of the amount of reasonable
royalties."
Samsung does not dispute that Ms. Davis
sufficiently explained her analysis of demand
in the lost profit context. Samsung is only
challenging that she did not repeat the same
information with all of the details in
testifying about her reasonable royalty
calculation. However, Ms. Davis expressly
testified that the demand factor for lost profits
was also relevant to the determination of a
reasonable royalty. A reasonable jury could
refer to Ms. Davis's testimony from an earlier
context and appropriately weigh the evidence
in considering Ms. Davis's calculation on the
royalty rates. Moreover, Ms. Davis's
testimony included additional substance on
the Georgia-Pacific factors. For example,
Ms. Davis expressly considered the cost to
Samsung of being out of the market long
enough to design around the patents, the
profits attributable to Samsung's use of the
patented technology, and the commercial
relationship between the parties. Taken as a
whole, Ms. Davis's testimony provided
sufficient evidence to support the jury's
reasonable royalty awards in the damages
retrial.
Finally, Samsung complained that Apple's
expert in the first damages trial, Mr. Musika,
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failed to explain his Georgia-Pacific analysis
and identified no evidence supporting his
royalty rates. Upon Apple's response,
Samsung acknowledges that Mr. Musika did
in fact identify and discuss specific GeorgiaPacific factors and that Mr. Musika referred
to an exhibit during his testimony. Samsung
now contends that the analysis was not
meaningful and the cited exhibit did not
discuss the Georgia-Pacific's factors at all.
Samsung's fault-finding is meritless.
We therefore affirm the district court's denial
of Samsung's motion for judgment as a matter
of law on the invalidity of claim 50 of the
‘163 patent and claim 8 of the ‘915 patent, as
well as the damages awarded for utility patent
infringement. We also affirm the district
court's denial of Samsung's motions for a new
trial on these same issues. We remand for
immediate entry of final judgment on all
damages awards not predicated on Apple's
trade dress claims and for any further
proceedings necessitated by our decision to
vacate the jury's verdicts on the unregistered
and registered trade dress claims.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-INPART,
VACATED-IN-PART
and
REMANDED.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Samsung Appeal on Apple Patent Award”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
March 21, 2016
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear an appeal from Samsung on what it must
pay Apple for infringing on part of the design
of the iPhone. In a brief supporting Samsung,
companies including Google and Facebook
said the legal framework governing the
design patents at issue was “out of step with
modern technology.”

In December, Samsung agreed to pay Apple
$548 million in damages in the case, but it
reserved the right to appeal to the Supreme
Court. The company now stands to recover as
much as $399 million of that, representing its
total profits from various models of phones
that Apple said, in a lawsuit filed in 2011,
infringed on its design patents.

Samsung, the Korean electronics company,
argued that design patents, which address
what products look like, are poorly suited to
complex devices with many features, adding
that they can give rise to disproportionate
penalties.

A Samsung spokeswoman, Danielle Meister
Cohen, said in a statement that the court’s
review “could lead to a fair interpretation of
patent law that will support creativity and
reward innovation.” Apple declined to
comment.

Design patents once covered household items
like spoons and fireplace grates — whose
design was central to the product — and a
finding of infringement required the
defendant to turn over all of its profits.
Samsung argued that this “total profit rule”
did not make sense in the digital era and
would “reward design patents far beyond the
value of any inventive contribution.”

The three design elements at issue in the case,
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., No.
15-777, are, in Samsung’s description, “a
particular black rectangular round-cornered
front face”; “a substantially similar
rectangular round-cornered front face plus
the surrounding rim”; and “a particular
colorful grid of sixteen icons.”

“In other words,” the company’s brief said,
“even if the patented features contributed 1
percent of the value of Samsung’s phones,
Apple gets 100 percent of Samsung’s
profits.”
Design patents are far less common than
utility patents, which cover how products
work. The Supreme Court has not heard a
design patent case in over a century.

In urging the Supreme Court not to hear the
case, Apple said the justices should not
reward a copycat.
“The iPhone’s explosive success was due in
no small part to its innovative design, which
included a distinctive front face and a
colorful graphical user interface — features
protected by U.S. design patents,” the
company’s brief said. “The innovation and
beauty of Apple’s designs were not only
hailed by consumers and the press, but envied
by Apple’s fiercest competitor, Samsung,
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which by its executive’s own admission in
related litigation is a ‘fast follower’ rather
than an innovator.”

“We are bound by what the statute says,
irrespective of policy arguments that may be
made against it,” the court said.

The justices agreed to decide only one of the
questions on which Samsung had sought
review: “Where a design patent is applied to
only a component of a product, should an
award of infringer’s profits be limited to
those profits attributable to the component?”

David Opderbeck, a law professor at Seton
Hall University, said the justices had focused
on an important issue.

Last year, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, a specialized court
that handles patent appeals, ruled that the
governing statute “explicitly authorizes the
award of total profit from the article of
manufacture bearing the patented design.”
The court appeared to acknowledge the
possibility that “an award of a defendant’s
entire profits for design patent infringement
makes no sense in the modern world.” But it
added that “those are policy arguments that
should be directed to Congress.”

“The key question is whether damages
relating to a design patent should be
apportioned in relation to the value added by
the patented design or can cover the
infringer’s entire profit on the infringing
product,” he said.
“The Federal Circuit read the design patent
law very literally and held that the entire
profits can be recovered,” he added. “In my
opinion, this is a far too literal reading of the
statute, particularly because a product’s
ornamental design very often is not the
primary driver of consumer demand and of
the manufacturer’s profits. In some ways, the
Federal Circuit’s ruling could allow design
patent law to swallow utility patent law,
making the ornamental design more
important than the underlying technology.”
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“Apple Case against Samsung Should Go Back to the Lower Court:
Justice Department”
Reuters
Dan Levine
June 9, 2016
The U.S. Department of Justice asked the
Supreme Court to overturn an appeals court
ruling that had favored Apple Inc over
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd in smartphone
patent litigation, and asked that it return the
case to the trial court for more litigation.
Samsung had appealed a federal appeals
court ruling to the Supreme Court, which
agreed to hear the case. The Justice
Department submitted its view in an amicus
brief on Wednesday.
An Apple spokeswoman declined to
comment, while Samsung told Reuters in a
statement it welcomes "overwhelming
support" for overturning the appeals court
ruling in favour of Apple from various parties
including the U.S. government.
"If left uncorrected, the appeals court's ruling
could lead to diminished innovation, pave the
way for design troll patent litigation and
negatively impact the economy and
consumers," the South Korean firm said.
The world's top smartphone rivals have been
feuding over patents since 2011, when Apple
sued Samsung in Northern California
alleging infringement of the iPhone's patents,
designs and trademarked appearance.
Following a 2012 jury trial, Samsung was
ordered to pay Apple $930 million. Samsung
has been trying to reduce that figure ever
since.

Its efforts were partially rewarded in May
2015, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the trademark
liability, bringing Samsung's exposure down
to $548 million.
The appeals court, however, upheld
Samsung's infringement of the iPhone's
patents, including those related to the designs
of the iPhone's rounded-corner front face,
bezel and colorful grid of icons.
Samsung then asked the Supreme Court to
review the design patent portion of the
decision, calling the damages awarded
excessive. In March, the justices agreed to
look into whether courts should award in
damages the total profits from a product that
infringes a design patent, if the patent applies
only to a component of the product.
In its amicus brief on Wednesday, the Justice
Department said it was unclear whether
Samsung had produced enough evidence to
support its argument that phone components,
not the entire phone, should be what matters
when calculating damages.
The Supreme Court should send the case
back for the trial court to determine whether
a new trial is warranted on that issue, the
Justice Department said.
The case is Samsung Electronics Co Ltd et al
vs. Apple Inc, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, No. 15-777.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Apple v. Samsung, First Design Patent Case
in a Centurty”
Ars Technica
Joe Mullin
March 21, 2016
If Apple was finally feeling like it had a solid
win after getting paid $548 million in patent
damages by Samsung—well, now it
shouldn't be so sure.

Apple sued over design patents on a black
rectangular front face with round corners, a
similar face with a surrounding rim or
"bezel," and its colorful grid of sixteen icons.

The Supreme Court said today that
it will consider what kind of damages should
be warranted when a design patent is found
to be infringed as the court takes up the
blockbuster Apple v. Samsung case.

The patents at issue are D618,677 (shown
below, a black rectangle with rounded
corners), D593,087 (with bezel on
surrounding rim), and D604,305 (colorful
grid of 16 icons.)

After a 13-day trial in 2012, a jury held that
Samsung's phones infringed Apple utility
and design patents. Apple was originally
granted $1.05 billion, but that number was
slashed down on appeal. Samsung paid $548
million late last year, but the company
didn't give up its right to one last appeal. A
Supreme Court win could result in Samsung
getting much of that money back.

Samsung's petition was supported by several
tech companies looking to lessen patent
damages as well as a brief from Public
Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.

In its petition, Samsung says that the massive
damage awarded based on three design
patents is a "ridiculous" result. In Samsung's
view, the company was ordered to pay 100
percent of its profits for several phones even
though there's no doubt that the patented
designs only made a small contribution.
"The decision below is thus an open
invitation to litigation abuse and has already
prompted grave concern across a range of US
companies about a new flood of extortionate
patent litigation, especially in the field of
high technology," write Samsung lawyers.

In the tech companies' amicus brief,
argue that Section 289 of the Patent
which dates to the 19th century,
envisages awards of an infringer's
profits on "relatively simple products."

they
Act,
only
total

"So far as the consumers are concerned, the
effect of design patent laws that are respected
is to give them more beautiful carpets and
wall-papers and oil-cloths," reads the House
Report on the bill that became Section 289.
The brief is signed by eight tech giants that
have found themselves mostly on the
defensive in patent cases dealing with both
"patent trolls" and competitors for years:
Dell, eBay, Facebook, Google, H-P, Newegg,
Pegasystems, and Vizio.
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Apple's brief in opposition reviews the
history of the case below, arguing that
Samsung is simply dead wrong on the law.
The company quotes the appeals court that
found Section 289 "explicitly authorizes the
award of total profit." It also blasts Samsung
again as being an egregious copycat and
patent infringer.
Samsung's petition "depends on a made-up
narrative in which Samsung, not Apple, is the
innovator,
despite
the
overwhelming evidence that Samsung copied
the iPhone’s innovative design," Apple says.
"Unlike
the
buttons,
knobs,
and
ugly protrusions of prior phones, Apple’s
iPhone was smooth and elegant and earned
immediate acclaim," write Apple lawyers.
"Although Samsung now tries to portray
itself
as an
innovator,
Samsung
acknowledged at the time that the iPhone’s
design was miles ahead of its own."

Little attention was paid to design patents
until the blockbuster 2012 trial. The New
York Times reports that the Supreme Court
hasn't heard a design patent case in more than
a century.
This case doesn't relate to the second Apple v.
Samsung patent trial, which covered a newer
generation of Samsung phones. That trial led
to a $120 million jury verdict in Apple's
favor, but Apple's win was thrown out
entirely last month when an appeals court
invalidated Apple's "slide to unlock" patent
and two others.
"We welcome the Court’s decision to hear
our case," a Samsung spokesperson said in a
statement earlier today. "The Court’s review
of this case can lead to a fair interpretation of
patent law that will support creativity and
reward innovation."
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“Court will reduce Apple's $930 million win in Samsung patent case”
The Verge
Adi Robertson
May 18, 2015
Apple and Samsung's patent infringement
battle isn't over, and in the latest ruling,
neither side has gotten exactly what it
wanted. In a filing posted today, the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed that Samsung had copied specific
design patents in Apple's iPhone. But the
court decided that Samsung wasn't infringing
on Apple's overall trade dress — the look and
feel of its phones. This means that while the
damages Apple was granted for patent
infringement will stand, the company's
overall $930 million award will be
downsized.
The court's analysis hinged on the idea that
trade dress had to be based on aesthetic
decisions meant to make something visually
distinctive, and that rules protecting it have to
be balanced with "a fundamental right to
compete through imitation of a competitor’s
product." While Apple argued that the
iPhone's rounded rectangle shape and rows of
square apps were designed to give it a
particular look that fit Apple's brand, the
court cited Apple's previous claims that the
shape was also easier to use. The same went
for its app icons, which were attractive but
also meant to make the iPhone more intuitive.
The current legal fight between Samsung and
Apple has been going on since 2011, when
Apple alleged that several Samsung phones
infringed on design and utility patents for its
iPhone. In 2012, a court found that Samsung
had indeed infringed on Apple's patents for
"bounce-back"
scrolling,
multitouch
gestures, and tap-to-zoom options on iOS. It

also found that Samsung's phones had
infringed on both officially registered and
unregistered iPhone trade dress. Apple had
requested $2.5 billion in damages, and it
ended up getting slightly over $1 billion.
Since then, Samsung and Apple have both
been trying to tilt the ruling and the damages
in their favor. Apple tried and failed to get a
sales ban on the infringing phones and tablets
(all of which have now been obsolete for
several years), and it requested an additional
$707 million from Samsung. It got neither of
these; in fact, its original damages were
recalculated and slightly cut back. Now that
the earlier decision has been struck down,
lower courts will have to calculate a new
damages number. Samsung, however, has
also had its share of disappointment. It lost a
second patent battle to Apple in 2014, for the
smaller amount of around $120 million. And
this latest ruling reaffirms that it infringed on
Apple's patents, so it's still going to be paying
out in this case — just not as much as
originally expected.
Apple, for its part, is optimistic about the
decision. "We are pleased the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeal confirmed Samsung
blatantly copied Apple products," said a
spokesperson on the news. "This is a victory
for design and those who respect it. Even
though Samsung must pay for its widespread
infringement of our patents, this case has
always been about more than money. It’s
about innovation and the hard work that goes
into inventing products that people love,
which is hard to put a price on."
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And, of course, so is Samsung. "We welcome
the US Court of Appeals' ruling overturning
Apple's infringement and damage claims
against Samsung over trade dress," its
spokesperson said. "Today's decision shows
that Apple's claims over trade dress and

damages lack merit and are grossly
exaggerated. We remain confident that our
products do not infringe on Apple’s design
patents and other intellectual property, and
we will continue to take all appropriate
measures to protect our products."
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Salman v. US
15-8049
Ruling Below: United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015)
Salman was accused of insider trading, having been tipped off by his brother-in-law (Maher
Kara) via his brother-in-law’s brother (Michael Kara). While no traditional gifts or transactions
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature were made, the Government showed evidence that the
tippee (Michael) and tipper (Maher) had a mutually beneficial and fulfilling familial relationship,
which Salman was aware of, and claimed that this was sufficient to meet the standard set in
Dirks v. S.E.C.
Salman was found guilty of four counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud. Salman subsequently appealed, claiming that a new standard set by
United States v. Newman from the Second Circuit should be applied. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision on the grounds that the familial relationship
presented sufficient evidence.
Question Presented: Whether the insider trading rule in Dirks v. SEC requires proof of “an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature,” as in United States v. Newman, or whether a close family
relationship between the tipper and tippee is sufficient.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Bassam Yacoub SALMAN, aka Bessam Jacob Salman, Defendant–Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on July 6, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Defendant–Appellant
Bassam
Yacoub
Salman appeals his conviction, following
jury trial, for conspiracy and insider trading.
He argues that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his conviction under the standard
announced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Newman, which he urges us to

adopt. We find that the evidence was
sufficient, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an insider-trading
scheme involving members of Salman's
extended family. On September 1, 2011,
Salman was indicted for one count of
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conspiracy to commit securities fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and four counts
of securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b–5,
240.10b5–1 and 240.10b5–2, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. At trial, the Government presented
evidence of the following:
In 2002, Salman's future brother-in-law
Maher Kara joined Citigroup's healthcare
investment banking group. Over the next few
years, Maher began to discuss aspects of his
job with his older brother, Mounir
(“Michael”) Kara. At first, Maher sought
help from Michael, who held an
undergraduate degree in chemistry, in
understanding scientific concepts relevant to
his work in the healthcare and biotechnology
sectors. In 2004, when their father was dying
of cancer, the focus of the brothers'
discussions shifted to companies that were
active in the areas of oncology and pain
management. Maher began to suspect that
Michael was trading on the information they
discussed, although Michael initially denied
it. As time wore on, Michael became more
brazen and more persistent in his requests for
inside information, and Maher knowingly
obliged. From late 2004 through early 2007,
Maher regularly disclosed to Michael
information about upcoming mergers and
acquisitions of and by Citigroup clients.
Meanwhile, in 2003, Maher Kara became
engaged to Salman's sister, Saswan (“Suzie”)
Salman. Over the course of the engagement,
the Kara family and the Salman family grew
close. In particular, Salman and Michael
Kara became fast friends. In the fall of 2004,
Michael began to share with Salman the
inside information that he had learned from
Maher, encouraging Salman to “mirror-imag
[e]” his trading activity. Rather than trade
through his own brokerage account, however,
Salman arranged to deposit money, via a
series of transfers through other accounts,

into a brokerage account held jointly in the
name of his wife's sister and her husband,
Karim Bayyouk. Salman then shared the
inside information with Bayyouk and the two
split the profits from Bayyouk's trading. The
brokerage records introduced at trial revealed
that, on numerous occasions from 2004 to
2007, Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed
nearly identical trades in securities issued by
Citigroup clients shortly before the
announcement of major transactions. As a
result of these trades, Salman and Bayyouk's
account
grew
from
$396,000
to
approximately $2.1 million.
Of particular relevance here, the Government
presented evidence that Salman knew full
well that Maher Kara was the source of the
information. Michael Kara (who pled guilty
and testified for the Government) testified
that, early in the scheme, Salman asked
where the information was coming from, and
Michael told him, directly, that it came from
Maher. Michael further testified about an
incident that occurred around the time of
Maher and Suzie's wedding in 2005.
According to Michael Kara, on that visit,
Michael noticed that there were many papers
relating to their stock trading strewn about
Salman's office. Michael became angry and
admonished Salman that he had to be careful
with the information because it was coming
from Maher. Michael testified that Salman
agreed that they had to “protect” Maher and
promised to shred all of the papers.
The Government further presented evidence
that Maher and Michael Kara enjoyed a close
and mutually beneficial relationship.
Specifically, the jury heard testimony that
Michael helped pay for Maher's college, that
he stood in for their deceased father at
Maher's wedding, and, as discussed above,
that Michael coached Maher in basic science
to help him succeed at his job. Maher, for his
part, testified that he “love[d] [his] brother
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very much” and that he gave Michael the
inside information in order to “benefit him”
and to “fulfill [ ] whatever needs he had.” For
example, Maher testified that on one
occasion, he received a call from Michael
asking
for
a
“favor,”
requesting
“information,” and explaining that he
“owe[d] somebody.” After Michael turned
down Maher's offer of money, Maher gave
him a tip about an upcoming acquisition
instead.

in breach of a fiduciary duty. After the
Second Circuit denied the Government's
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc, Salman promptly moved for leave to
file a supplemental brief arguing that the
Government's evidence in the instant case
was insufficient under the standard
announced in Newman, which he urged this
Court to adopt. We granted Salman's motion
and gave the Government an opportunity to
respond.

Finally, the Government presented evidence
that Salman was aware of the Kara brothers'
close fraternal relationship. The Salmans and
the Karas were tightly knit families, and
Salman would have had ample opportunity to
observe Michael and Maher's interactions at
their regular family gatherings. For example,
Michael gave a toast at Maher's wedding,
which Salman attended, in which Michael
described how he spoke to his younger
brother nearly every day and described
Maher as his “mentor,” his “private counsel,”
and “one of the most generous human beings
he knows.” Maher, overcome with emotion,
began to weep.

DISCUSSION

The jury found Salman guilty on all five
counts. Salman then moved for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, on the ground, inter alia,
that there was no evidence that he knew that
the tipper disclosed confidential information
in exchange for a personal benefit. The
district court denied his motion in full.
Salman timely appealed, but did not raise a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
in his opening brief. After he filed his reply
brief, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Newman, vacated the insider-trading
convictions of two individuals on the ground
that the Government failed to present
sufficient evidence that they knew the
information they received had been disclosed

A.
The threshold question is whether Salman
waived the present argument by failing to
raise it in his opening brief on this appeal,
even though he had raised it below and, after
Newman was decided, promptly raised it in a
supplemental brief that the Government
responded to before oral argument.
Ordinarily, we will not consider “ ‘matters on
appeal that are not specifically and distinctly
argued in appellant's opening brief.’ ”
However, we make an exception to this
general rule (1) for “good cause shown” or “if
a failure to do so would result in manifest
injustice,” (2) “when it is raised in the
appellee's brief,” or (3) “if the failure to raise
the issue properly did not prejudice the
defense of the opposing party.”
The third exception applies here. As both
parties have had a full opportunity to brief
this issue and to address it at oral argument,
the Government cannot complain of
prejudice. Accordingly, we address Salman's
claim on the merits.
B.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must determine whether,
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when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Government, the evidence was “
‘adequate to allow any rational trier of fact to
find the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Salman urges
us to adopt Newman as the law of this Circuit,
and contends that, under Newman, the
evidence was insufficient to find either that
Maher Kara disclosed the information to
Michael Kara in exchange for a personal
benefit, or, if he did, that Salman knew of
such benefit.
The “personal benefit” requirement for tippee
liability derives from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Dirks v. S.E.C. Dirks presented an
unusual fact pattern. Ronald Secrist, a
whistleblower at a company called Equity
Funding, had contacted Raymond Dirks, a
well-known securities analyst, after Secrist's
prior disclosures to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had gone for
naught. Secrist, for no other purpose than
exposing the Equity Funding fraud, disclosed
inside information about the company to
Dirks, who in turn launched his own
investigation that eventually led to public
exposure of a massive fraud. However, in the
process of his investigation, Dirks openly
discussed the information provided by Secrist
with various clients and investors, some of
whom then sold their Equity Funding stock
on the basis of that information. Upon
learning this, the SEC charged Dirks with
securities fraud, and this position was upheld
by an SEC Administrative Law Judge and
affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit,
after which certiorari was granted.
When the case came to the Supreme Court,
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began
by noting that, whistleblowing quite aside,
corporate insiders, in the many conversations
they typically have with stock analysts, often
accidentally or mistakenly disclose material
information that is not immediately available
to the public. Thus, “[i]mposing a duty to

disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic
information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role
of market analysts, which the SEC itself
recognizes is necessary to the preservation of
a healthy market.” At the same time, the
Court continued, “[t]he need for a ban on
some tippee trading is clear. Not only are
insiders forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship
from
personally
using
undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such
information to an outsider for the same
improper purpose of exploiting the
information for their personal gain.”
“Thus, the test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure,” for in that case the
insider is breaching his fiduciary duty to the
company's shareholders not to exploit
company information for his personal
benefit. And a tippee is equally liable if “the
tippee knows or should know that there has
been [such] a breach,” i.e., knows of the
personal benefit.
Of particular importance here, the Court then
went on to define what constitutes the
“personal benefit” that constitutes the breach
of fiduciary duty. It would include, for
example, “a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future
earnings.” However, “[t]he elements of
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend.”
The last-quoted holding of Dirks governs this
case. Maher's disclosure of confidential
information to Michael, knowing that he
intended to trade on it, was precisely the “gift
of confidential information to a trading
relative” that Dirks envisioned. Indeed,
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Maher himself testified that, by providing
Michael with inside information, he intended
to “benefit” his brother and to “fulfill[ ]
whatever needs he had.” As to Salman's
knowledge, Michael Kara, whose testimony
we must credit on a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, testified that he
directly told Salman that it was Michael's
brother Maher who was, repeatedly, leaking
the inside information that Michael then
conveyed to Salman, and that Salman later
agreed that they had to “protect” Maher from
exposure. Given the Kara brothers' close
relationship, Salman could readily have
inferred Maher's intent to benefit Michael.
Thus, there can be no question that, under
Dirks, the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to find that Maher disclosed the information
in breach of his fiduciary duties and that
Salman knew as much.
Salman, however, argues that the Second
Circuit in Newman interpreted Dirks to
require more than this. Of course, Newman is
not binding on us, and our own reading of
Dirks is guided by the clearly applicable
language italicized above. But we would not
lightly ignore the most recent ruling of our
sister circuit in an area of law that it has
frequently encountered.
The defendants in Newman, Todd Newman
and Anthony Chiasson, both portfolio
managers, were charged with trading on
material non-public information regarding
two companies, Dell and NVIDIA, obtained
by a group of analysts at various hedge funds
and investment firms. The information came
to them via two distinct tipping chains. The
Dell tipping chain originated with Rob Ray,
a member of Dell's investor relations
department. Ray tipped information
regarding Dell's earnings numbers to Sandy
Goyal, an analyst. Goyal, in turn, relayed the
information to Jesse Tortora, another analyst,
who relayed it to his manager, Newman, as

well as to other analysts including Spyridon
Adondakis, who passed it to Chiasson. The
NVIDIA tipping chain began with Chris
Choi, of NVIDIA's finance unit, who tipped
inside information to his acquaintance Hyung
Lim, who passed it to Danny Kuo, an analyst,
who circulated it to his analyst friends,
including Tortora and Adondakis, who in
turn gave it to Newman and Chiasson.
Having received this information, Newman
and Chiasson executed trades in both Dell
and NVIDIA stock, generating lavish profits
for their respective funds.
The Government presented the following
evidence regarding the relationships between
the Dell and NVIDIA insiders and their
respective tippees. The Dell tipper and
tippee, Ray and Goyal, attended business
school together and had been colleagues at
Dell, but were not “close.” Goyal provided
career advice and assistance to Ray, for
example,
discussing
the
qualifying
examination required to become an analyst
and editing his résumé. This advice began
before Ray started to give Goyal information,
and Goyal testified that he would have given
it as a routine professional courtesy without
receiving anything in return. As to the
NVIDIA tips, the insider, Choi, and his
tippee, Lim, were “family friends” who met
through church and occasionally socialized
with one another. Lim testified that he did not
provide anything of value to Choi in return
for the tips, and that Choi did not know that
he was trading in NVIDIA stock.
The Second Circuit held that this evidence
was insufficient to establish that either Ray or
Choi received a personal benefit in exchange
for the tip. It noted that, although the
“personal benefit” standard is “permissive,”
it “does not suggest that the Government may
prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the
mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a
75

casual or social nature.” Instead, to the extent
that “a personal benefit may be inferred from
a personal relationship between the tipper
and tippee, ... such an inference is
impermissible in the absence of proof of a
meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature.”
Applying these standards, the court
concluded that the “circumstantial evidence
... was simply too thin to warrant the
inference that the corporate insiders received
any personal benefit in exchange for their
tips,” and furthermore, that “the Government
presented absolutely no testimony or any
other evidence that Newman and Chiasson
knew they were trading on information
obtained from insiders, or that those insiders
received any benefit in exchange for such
disclosures.”
Salman reads Newman to hold that evidence
of a friendship or familial relationship
between tipper and tippee, standing alone, is
insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper
received a benefit. In particular, he focuses
on the language indicating that the exchange
of information must include “at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature,” which he reads as referring
to the benefit received by the tipper. Salman
argues that because there is no evidence that
Maher received any such tangible benefit in
exchange for the inside information, or that
Salman knew of any such benefit, the
Government failed to carry its burden.
To the extent Newman can be read to go so
far, we decline to follow it. Doing so would
require us to depart from the clear holding of
Dirks that the element of breach of fiduciary
duty is met where an “insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative

or friend.” Indeed, Newman itself recognized
that the “ ‘personal benefit is broadly defined
to include not only pecuniary gain, but also,
inter alia, ... the benefit one would obtain
from simply making a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.’ ”
In our case, the Government presented direct
evidence that the disclosure was intended as
a gift of market-sensitive information.
Specifically, Maher Kara testified that he
disclosed the material nonpublic information
for the purpose of benefitting and providing
for his brother Michael. Thus, the evidence
that Maher Kara breached his fiduciary duties
could not have been more clear, and the fact
that the disclosed information was marketsensitive—and therefore within the reach of
the securities laws, was obvious on its face. If
Salman's theory were accepted and this
evidence found to be insufficient, then a
corporate insider or other person in
possession of confidential and proprietary
information would be free to disclose that
information to her relatives, and they would
be free to trade on it, provided only that she
asked for no tangible compensation in return.
Proof that the insider disclosed material
nonpublic information with the intent to
benefit a trading relative or friend is
sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary
duty element of insider trading.
In Salman's case, the jury had more than
enough facts, as described above, to infer that
when Maher Kara gave inside information to
Michael Kara, he knew that there was a
potential (indeed, a virtual certainty) that
Michael would trade on it. And while Salman
may not have been aware of all the details of
the Kara brothers' relationship, the jury could
easily have found that, as a close friend and
member (through marriage) of the close-knit
Kara clan, Salman must have known that,
when Maher gave confidential information to
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Michael, he did so with the “intention to
benefit” a close relative.
Accordingly, we find that the evidence was
more than sufficient for a rational jury to find
both that the inside information was
disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, and
that Salman knew of that breach at the time
he traded on it.
AFFIRMED.
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“An Insider Trading Case Heads to the Supreme Court”
The New York Times
Peter J. Henning
January 20, 2016

The Justice Department got its wish on
Tuesday, at least in a backhanded way, when
the Supreme Court unexpectedly granted
review of an insider trading conviction.
After rejecting the government’s request to
review the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Newman in October, which
overturned two convictions for insider
trading, the Supreme Court decided to review
a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Salman that upheld a conviction for trading
on inside information.
Even though Justice Department lost a
number of convictions as a result of the
decision in the Newman case, the Salman
case may be a better vehicle for the
department to argue that the justices should
take a broad view of the circumstances that
will support finding that providing inside
information was illegal.
To prove an act of tipping is illegal, the
Supreme Court stated in 1983 in Dirks v.
S.E.C., “the test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure.” That benefit can be
tangible, like money or services, or “when an
insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.”

In the Newman case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned
the convictions of two hedge fund managers,
Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, who
received corporate earnings information
through a chain of analysts, never dealing
directly with the insiders who made the
disclosures. The appeals court found that the
jury instructions failed to require a finding
that the defendants knew a benefit was passed
between the recipients, called the tippees, and
their tippers.
In reaching that result, the appeals court also
explained that when the violation is based on
friendship between tipper and tippee, then the
government must show “a meaningfully
close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”
That language drew the ire of the Justice
Department, which asked the Supreme Court
to review the decision. A brief filed by
Donald B. Verrilli Jr., the solicitor general,
argued that the Newman decision effectively
rewrote the requirements in the Dirks case for
proving tipping.
If the case was not overturned, he wrote, it
would
“hurt
market
participants,
disadvantage scrupulous market analysts, and
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impair the government’s ability to protect the
fairness and integrity of the securities
markets.”
The
Supreme
Court
rejected
the
government’s petition, leaving the appeals
court’s decision undisturbed.
It is unclear whether the concerns expressed
about the potential impact of the Newman
case were well founded. Just last week, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the conspiracy and
securities fraud convictions of David Riley,
the former chief information officer at
Foundry Networks, for giving information to
Matthew G. Teeple, an adviser to a hedge
fund, about the impending acquisition of the
company by Brocade Communications.
Their relationship was based on friendship,
much like in the Newman case, but the
government’s evidence went further than just
casual social interactions between them. Mr.
Teeple gave Mr. Riley investment advice,
assisted in his search for a job and advised an
angel investment group Mr. Riley had put
together with other former Foundry
executives. The appeals court found this
sufficient to establish the passing of an
“immediately pecuniary tangible benefit”
between them, meeting the requirement of
the decisions in the Newman and Dirks cases
for a violation.
The Justice Department and the Securities
and Exchange Commission may well have
made their peace with the Newman case, and
the result in Mr. Riley’s case gave some
comfort that the law would not take a strong
turn against the government. But just days
later
came
the
Supreme
Court’s

announcement that it would review the
Salman case to consider what the Dirks case
requires for proving insider trading, calling
into question whether the justices might raise
the bar for proving liability for tipping.
In that case, Maher F. Kara, a former
investment banker at Citigroup, disclosed
information about health care deals to his
older brother, Michael. The brothers were
part of a close family and spoke with each
other nearly every day. Maher Kara testified
that he gave his brother the information to
“benefit him” and “fulfill whatever needs he
had.”
Bassam Yacoub Salman, in turn, started
receiving inside information through
Michael, whom Mr. Salman knew because
his sister had become Maher Kara’s fiancée.
Mr. Salman was convicted of trading on the
confidential information that Maher Kara
took from Citigroup, making a profit of about
$1.7 million. No money ever changed hands
in exchange for the information, and the
benefits were of the type usually seen in that
situation: love and affection.
In an interesting twist, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
written by Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Federal
District Court for the Southern District in
Manhattan, who has presided over a number
of insider trading cases and was sitting on the
appeals court by designation. Although he
would normally be bound by the decision in
the Newman case in a matter in his own
courtroom, he was not required to follow it
when a different appeals court reviewed a
conviction.
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The appeals court rejected Mr. Salman’s
argument that the Newman case required
showing a tangible benefit beyond the close
familial relationship. “To the extent Newman
can be read to go so far, we decline to follow
it,” Judge Rakoff wrote. Instead, the opinion
concluded there was sufficient evidence that
the information “was intended as a gift” to
meet the requirements of the Supreme
Court’s analysis in the Dirks case.

Although the Justice Department might have
preferred to have the Newman case reviewed,
the facts underlying Mr. Salman’s conviction
may give the government a better opportunity
to ask the Supreme Court to uphold the
conviction. As an initial matter, the jury has
already found the evidence sufficient to show
a benefit, so the justices may not want to
substitute their judgment for that of the
jurors.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
did not specifically disagree with the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, but it took a
more forgiving approach to what is necessary
to show a benefit in a tipping case.

Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson were far
removed from the original sources of the
inside information, who were never charged
for their disclosure. That made it difficult to
fathom how a tippee could be liable when the
tipper did not rate being accused of violating
the law. Thus, it was not difficult to see why
the appeals court found that the government’s
evidence “was simply too thin to warrant the
inference that the corporate insiders received
any personal benefit in exchange for their
tips.”

Does that mean there is a conflict between the
appellate courts that the Supreme Court
needs to resolve?
The Justice Department pointed to the
conflicting approaches as a reason for the
Supreme Court to review the Newman case,
asking the justices “to restore a uniform
interpretation of Dirks.” But in opposing Mr.
Salman’s petition for review, the government
argued that “review is less warranted here
than in Newman because the decision that
petitioner urges this court to review is correct
and wholly consistent with Dirks.”
In other words, the Justice Department
essentially claimed that after refusing to
review the Newman case, the Supreme Court
should just let sleeping dogs lie. That did not
persuade the justices, however, especially as
the Salman case squarely presents the
question about how much evidence is needed
to prove a benefit when it is based on
friendship or family, not something tangible.

In Mr. Salman’s case, on the other hand, there
was a close-knit family along with testimony
from Maher Kara, the tipper, that he intended
to benefit his brother Michael by dispensing
highly sensitive deal information. Although
earnings projections are passed around with
regularity among analysts, information about
deals is highly valuable and clearly
confidential, so showing that a tippee knew
about a benefit when it comes through family
ties might be closer to what the Supreme
Court has already said is a violation in the
Dirks case.
Judge Rakoff pointed out that if the evidence
of the benefit in Mr. Salman’s case was
insufficient, “then a corporate insider or other
person in possession of confidential and
80

proprietary information would be free to
disclose that information to her relatives, and
they would be free to trade on it, provided
only that she asked for no tangible
compensation in return.”
Don’t be surprised to see the Justice
Department quote this line as the primary
basis for asking the Supreme Court to uphold
the conviction and not impose more onerous
requirements for proving that tipping
confidential information is a violation. So
although the government did not get what it
wanted in the Newman case, it may get the
result it desires – a broad reading of liability
for tipping inside information – in the Salman
case.
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“Supreme Court Decides To Weigh In On Insider Trading”
Forbes
Michael Bobelian
January 20, 2016

Months after turning down the Department of
Justice’s request to review an appeal of an
insider trading case, the Supreme Court
yesterday agreed to hear a different insider
trading case that has split the nation’s
appellate courts.
The case in question, Salman v. United
States, comes from a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals case from last year that applied a less
stringent legal standard than the one
employed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 2014.
It is typical for the Supreme Court to weigh
in on circuit splits where federal appellate
courts from across the country apply or
interpret laws differently. What’s at stake in
this case is whether the justices will approve
the Ninth Circuit’s methodology, and thereby
make it easier for prosecutors to pursue
certain types of insider trading claims.
In U.S. v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit had to
determine whether the defendant’s actions
met the standards set out by the Supreme
Court in Dirks v. S.E.C., a seminal opinion
issued in 1983.
Insider trading is largely a product of judicial
decisions rather than federal statutes. As a
result, the nation’s federal appellate courts
have used Dirks as their guide over the years.

The appeal arose over Dirks‘s requirement
that an original tipper – the first person to
share confidential information – gain either
“directly or indirectly” from an insider
trading transaction.
Under Dirks, tippees – the people who
receive and trade on confidential information
– can only be found guilty of insider trading
if they know that the tippers received some
“personal benefit” for passing on the illicit
information. This standard applies to tippees
even if they are two or more steps removed
from the original tipper.
In Salman, the defendant, Bassam Yacoub
Salman, received confidential information
about potential health care deals from
Michael Kara, who had received it from his
brother Maher Kara, designating Maher as a
downstream tippee in insider trading
parlance.
Salman traded on the information for a profit
of little more than $1.7 million but never paid
Maher for the information.
The question for the Ninth Circuit was
whether Maher saw some direct or indirect
gain from the information he had divulged to
his brother and whether Salman knew of this
personal benefit.
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The court found that Maher had indeed
received an intangible benefit by helping his
brother, with whom he was very close,
financially through the exchange of
confidential information and that Salman,
who became Maher’s brother-in-law, knew
of the benefits Maher derived from these
exchanges.

Newman made it much more difficult to
pursue downstream tippees by requiring
more direct connections between the original
tippers and those that ultimately profited
from the confidential information. It also
declared that mere friendships or other close
relationships are not enough to constitute the
personal benefit requirement posed in Dirks.

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling sharply differed
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
which oversees the largest number of insider
trading cases because of its location in New
York.

Weeks after the Supreme Court declined to
hear the government’s appeal in the Newman
case last October, Preet Bharara, the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, dropped insider trading charges against
seven defendants. “These prosecutions were
all undertaken in good faith reliance on what
this Office and others, including able defense
counsel for all those who pled guilty,
understood to be the well-settled law before
Newman,” Bharara said when announcing the
move.

In late 2014, the Second Circuit overturned
the convictions of Todd Newman and
Anthony Chiasson, two hedge fund portfolio
managers who were found guilty of trading
on confidential information they had received
through second-hand sources rather than
original tippers. In U.S. v. Newman, the
Second Circuit had to determine whether the
links between Newman and Chiasson and the
original tippers were too inconsequential and
whether the defendants knew of any tangible
benefits accorded to these tippers for their
transmission of insider information.
“First, the Government’s evidence of any
personal benefit received by the alleged
insiders was insufficient to establish the
tipper liability from which defendants’
purported tippee liability would derive,”
Judge Barrington Parker wrote for the
appellate panel. “Second,… the Government
presented no evidence that Newman and
Chiasson knew that they were trading on
information obtained from insiders in
violation of those insiders’ fiduciary duties.”

When the government filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court, it warned that if Newman
was “allowed to stand, the court of appeals’
novel… standard will restrict enforcement
of… insider trading.”
In Salman, the Ninth Circuit sided with the
Department of Justice. Following the Second
Circuit’s approach, the Ninth Circuit
declared would “require us to depart from the
clear holding of Dirks that the element of
breach of fiduciary duty is met where an
‘insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.’”
The facts in the two cases were not identical,
leaving the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to borrow from both circuit
rulings in arriving at its decision. The justices
are set to hear the case later in this term.
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“Judge Rakoff Ruling on Tips May Help Prosecution on Insider Trading
Cases”
The New York Times
Peter J. Henning
July 7, 2015

Insider trading cases based on the passing of
tips seemed endangered after a decision by
the federal appeals court in Manhattan in
December.
The case, United States v. Newman, decided
at the end of 2014, reversed the convictions
of two hedge fund managers for insider
trading. The ruling also troubled prosecutors
and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, by making it more difficult to
prove a violation by requiring proof that a
tipper received a tangible benefit in exchange
for providing inside information.
It seemed as if all prominent defendants
convicted of insider trading, like Raj
Rajaratnam and Mathew Martoma, were
asking to have their convictions overturned
because of the Newman opinion.
But a decision from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in California
has taken some of the bite out of the Newman
decision. That ruling adopts a more favorable
standard for proving a violation when inside
information is passed among family
members.

And in a fascinating twist, the author of the
opinion is Jed S. Rakoff, a United States
District Court judge in Manhattan, who had
earlier expressed concern with the Newman
decision.
The Newman case involved two hedge fund
managers — Todd Newman and Anthony R.
Chiasson — who were tried together. They
were at the end of a chain of analysts who
were passing along information about
impending
corporate
earnings
announcements, and earning handsome
profits by trading ahead of the disclosures.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed their convictions,
saying that the trial judge had not instructed
the jury that it had to find that the defendants
knew the original source of the information
had received a benefit from tipping off others.
The real problem for the government came in
a short discussion about what evidence was
needed to establish that the tipper had
received an impermissible benefit. The
Newman opinion asserted that it must involve
something more than a casual friendship
between the tipper and tippee.

84

As the court wrote, there must be proof of a
“meaningfully close personal relationship” in
which there was “an exchange that is
objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature.”
The appeals court didn’t explain exactly what
that meant, leaving an opening for defendants
like Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Martoma to
argue that the government’s proof was
insufficient.
The Justice Department asked the appeals
court to reconsider, a request rejected in
April. Prosecutors are considering whether to
seek Supreme Court review.
United States v. Salman, which was heard
before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, took a more favorable view
of what the government has to prove in a
tipping case.
In that case, Maher F. Kara, a former
investment banker at Citigroup, provided
information about health care deals to his
older brother, Michael, who traded on it. The
brothers were part of a very close family,
speaking with each other nearly every day.
Maher Kara testified that he gave his brother
the information to “benefit him” and “fulfill
whatever needs he had.”
Bassam Yacoub Salman, in turn, started
receiving the inside information through
Michael (Mr. Salman knew the family
because his sister had become Maher Kara’s
fiancée). Mr. Salman was convicted of
trading on the confidential information that
Maher Kara took from Citigroup. No money
ever changed hands, and the benefits Mr.
Kara received from Michael were of the type

usually exchanged between family members:
love and affection.
The Newman opinion came out while Mr.
Salman’s case was before the Ninth Circuit.
Mr. Salman argued that the Second Circuit’s
decision should be applied to his case,
asserting that the government did not
introduce sufficient evidence that a tangible
benefit had been received by Maher Kara.
Judge Rakoff was assigned to the three-judge
panel hearing Mr. Salman’s appeal under a
statute that authorizes federal district judges
to sit on an appeals court “whenever the
business of that court so requires.” Judges are
assigned randomly to cases, so it was the luck
of the draw that put him on yet another
closely watched insider trading case.
This is not the first time Judge Rakoff has
considered the scope of the Newman
decision. In S.E.C. v. Payton, decided in
April, he rejected the argument of two
defendants who were friends and had sought
to dismiss insider trading charges because the
S.E.C. had not identified a sufficient benefit
being given in exchange for the information.
Judge Rakoff expressed some unease with
the Newman opinion when he wrote that the
appeals court’s conclusion about what
constitutes a benefit “may not be obvious.”
He added that the opinion’s interpretation of
the law did not make it “easy for a lower
court” to conform with the Supreme Court
decision in Dirks v. S.E.C. that established
the benefits test.
In Dirks, decided in 1983, the Supreme Court
said that the benefit to the tipper may be
tangible, but can “also exist when an insider
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makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend.”
Judge Rakoff found that the S.E.C. complaint
included enough detail about potential
benefits exchanged between the defendants,
so the insider case could move forward.
A federal district court must follow the
dictates of the appellate court under which it
sits, so Judge Rakoff has to follow the
precedents of the Second Circuit, including
the Newman decision. But once he was
designated to sit on the Ninth Circuit, he had
a freer hand to consider the proper analysis of
what type of benefit to a tipper was sufficient
for insider trading liability.
In the Salman opinion, Judge Rakoff pointed
out that the Second Circuit’s decision is not
binding on the Ninth Circuit, but noted that
“we would not lightly ignore the most recent
ruling of our sister circuit in an area of law
that it has frequently encountered.” He wrote
that if the Newman case meant that every
benefit provided to a tipper had to be
tangible, then “we decline to follow it”
because it would “depart from the clear
holding of Dirks” that recognized gifts as an
acceptable benefit.
Without saying he disagreed with the
Newman approach, he pointed out that it
could go too far in protecting tipping in
certain situations. “A corporate insider or
other person in possession of confidential and
proprietary information would be free to
disclose that information to her relatives, and
they would be free to trade on it, provided
only that she asked for no tangible
compensation in return,” he wrote.

In finding that passing along information
among close family members was sufficient
even without proof of a tangible benefit,
Judge Rakoff emphasized what a narrower
reading of the law might entail.
Judge Rakoff’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit
did not directly reject the Newman decision,
which would have set up the type of
disagreement among the appeals courts that
the Supreme Court might step in to resolve.
Instead, the decision views tipping
information among family members as very
different from the Newman case, in which the
participants in the trading were casual social
acquaintances
with
little continuing
connection among them. Thus, in Judge
Rakoff’s view, close family members like
those in the Salman case do not need anything
more than love and affection to establish that
there was a benefit received for insider
information.
The Newman and Salman cases set very
different limits for the benefit element of
tipping. If the defendants are just friends, and
perhaps not very good ones, then the benefit
to the tipper must have a tangible value.
When information passes between close
family members, then the benefit is
essentially presumed, and additional
evidence beyond their relationship is
unnecessary.
As more tipping cases work through the
system, the courts will have to figure out how
they fit under the decisions of both the
Second and Ninth Circuits. cases involving
more distant relatives, or those who do not
interact on a regular basis, may be murkier.
Still, an especially close friendship might be
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enough to establish that giving the
information was a gift sufficient to show the
benefit.
For prosecutors and the S.E.C., the Salman
opinion gives them something to point to on
what constitutes the requisite benefit in
exchange for insider information that avoids
the tougher test in the Newman decision.

The Newman and Salman decisions are not
taking opposite positions, but are not
harmonious, either. Judge Rakoff’s opinion
limits the effect of the Second Circuit’s
decision on insider trading law by simply
ignoring its benefit analysis for family
members passing along inside information. It
will be interesting to see whether other courts
follow Judge Rakoff’s reasoning about the
Newman decision.
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Visa, Inc. v. Stoumbos & Visa, Inc. v. Osborn
15-962 & 15-961
Ruling Below: Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
A group brought action against a collective of banks and bankcard association, claiming that said
collective was in violation of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive activities. The
motion was dismissed, and the motion to amend the complaint was denied. The plaintiffs
appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, that they had sufficiently
alleged their claim of horizontal conspiracy, and that member banks failed to establish
withdrawal from conspiracy.
Question Presented: Whether allegations that members of a business association agreed to
adhere to the association's rules and possess governance rights in the association, without more,
are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, as the Court of Appeals held below, or are insufficient, as the Third, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits have held.

Sam OSBORN, et al., Appellants
v.
VISA INC., et al., Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on August 4, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
Users and operators of independent (nonbank) automated teller machines (ATMs)
brought these related actions against Visa,
MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks,
alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing
ATM access fees. The crux of the Plaintiffs'
complaints is that when someone uses a nonbank ATM, the cardholder pays a greater fee
and the ATM operator earns a lower return on

each transaction because of certain Visa and
MasterCard network rules. These rules
prohibit differential pricing based on the cost
of the network that links the ATM to the
cardholder's bank. In other words, the
Plaintiffs allege anticompetitive harm
because Visa and MasterCard prevent an
independent operator from charging less, and
potentially earning more, when an ATM
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transaction is processed through a network
unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard.
The District Court concluded that the
Plaintiffs had failed to allege essential
components of standing, and also that they
had failed to allege an agreement in restraint
of trade cognizable under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. We disagree, and so we
vacate and remand these cases for further
proceedings based on the proposed amended
complaint.
I.
ATMs “have been a part of the American
landscape since the 1970s—beacons of selfservice and convenience, they revolutionized
banking in ways we take for granted today.”
One view is that “[t]hey live to serve; we only
really notice them when we can't seem to
locate one.” But Plaintiffs tell us they do take
notice of ATMs—specifically, of the fee
structure that attaches to their use and what
they gain or lose from it. We credit for
purposes of this appeal all facts alleged in the
proposed amended complaints.
Some background history: Until the mid–
1990s, consumers who wished to withdraw
cash from their bank accounts generally
could do so only by visiting a bank branch or
a bank-operated ATM. But states began to
abolish various laws that had prohibited
ATM operators from charging access fees
directly to cardholders. This created a
financial incentive for nonbanks to enter the
ATM market, and independent ATMs took
root accordingly. These independent ATMs
connect to a cardholder's bank through an
ATM network. The most popular networks
are operated by Visa (the Plus, Interlink, and
VisaNet networks) and MasterCard (the
Cirrus and Maestro networks).

Today, a cardholder can use any independent
ATM to access her bank account, so long as
her bank card and the ATM are linked by at
least one common network. Most bank cards
indicate the networks to which they are
linked with logos printed on the back of the
card, referred to colloquially as “bugs.”
Independent ATM operators rely on two
streams of revenue to sustain their
businesses. The first is the “net interchange”
fee: the gross interchange fee paid by the
cardholder's bank to the ATM operator,
which runs between $0.00 and $0.60 per
transaction, less any network services fee
charged by the ATM network. MasterCard
and Visa generally charge high network
services fees, which means that ATM
operators receive low net interchange fees—
running between $0.06 and $0.29 for
domestic transactions, and even less for
international transactions—for transactions
on these networks. Several competing
networks charge comparatively low network
services fees, thus enabling an ATM operator
to collect a higher net interchange fee (up to
$0.50 per transaction) when using the lowerfee networks.
The second source of revenue comes from the
ATM access fees paid by the cardholder. The
average access fee in 2012 was $2.10.
Visa and MasterCard each impose, as a
condition for ATM operators to access their
networks, a sort of nondiscrimination or most
favored customer clause called the “Access
Fee Rules.” These rules provide that no ATM
operator may charge customers whose
transactions are processed on Visa or
MasterCard networks a greater access fee
than that charged to any customer whose
transaction is processed on an alternative
ATM network. Thus, under the Access Fee
Rules, operators cannot say to cardholders:
“We will charge you $2.00 for a MasterCard
89

or Visa transaction, but if your card has a Star
or Credit Union 24 bug on it, we will charge
you only $1.75.”
Both Visa and MasterCard were owned and
operated as joint ventures by a large group of
retail banks at the time that the Access Fee
Rules were adopted. Although these member
banks later relinquished direct control over
the bankcard associations through public
offerings, the IPOs did not alter the substance
of the Access Fee Rules, which remain intact
to this day.
Plaintiffs assert that these rules illegally
restrain the efficient pricing of ATM
services. They characterize the Access Fee
Rules as constituting an “anti-steering”
regime that prevents independent ATM
operators from incentivizing cardholders to
choose and use cards “that are more efficient
and less costly than either Visa or
MasterCard's.”
This consolidated appeal arises from
decisions in three separate but related civil
actions. The first action, Stoumbos v. Visa,
was filed by a debit cardholder, Mary
Stoumbos, who paid access fees in
connection with ATM transactions at various
independent ATMs. The second action,
Mackmin v. Visa (referred to here as the
Osborn case), was filed by four consumers of
independent and bank-run ATM services.
The third action, National ATM Council v.
Visa, was brought by a leading association of
independent ATM operators and several
individual ATM operators. The Plaintiffs
allege violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act as well as various state laws, and they
name Visa and MasterCard entities as
defendants. In addition, the Osborn plaintiffs
name certain member banks as codefendants.

On February 12, 2013, the District Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs' respective
complaints had failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish standing and, in the
alternative, lacked adequate facts to establish
concerted activity under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. It dismissed not just the
complaints, but the cases without prejudice.
In an attempt to toll the statute of limitations,
Plaintiffs timely moved the District Court to
modify its judgment from dismissal of the
cases without prejudice to dismissal of the
complaints with leave to replead. Plaintiffs
simultaneously submitted proposed amended
complaints. On December 19, 2013, the
District Court denied Plaintiffs' motions after
concluding that their proposed amended
complaints still lacked sufficient facts to
establish standing or a conspiracy. The
Plaintiffs appeal.
II.
Procedural quirks notwithstanding, we
review de novo the District Court's
determination that the filing of the amended
complaints would be futile due to the
perceived deficiencies of those complaints
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). To reach
that bottom line, we must do some procedural
untangling.
The District Court's February 12 order
dismissed the cases without prejudice. The
principle guiding a dismissal without
prejudice is that absent futility or special
circumstances (such as undue delay, bad
faith, or dilatory motive), a plaintiff should
have the opportunity to replead so that claims
will be decided on merits rather than
technicalities. Where, as it appears was the
case here, a plaintiff has not notified the
district court that a statute of limitations issue
might bar the plaintiff “from correcting the
complaint's defects and filing a new lawsuit,”
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a dismissal of the case without prejudice is
not an abuse of discretion.

proposed amended complaints adequately
stated a claim.

Plaintiffs followed an appropriate course
against this background, asking the District
Court to modify its judgment pursuant to
Rule 59—so that merely the complaint, and
not the case, would have been dismissed—
and simultaneously filing a proposed
amended complaint. In its December 19
opinion on those motions, the District Court
asked and answered the essential question—
whether leave to amend was futile—but the
accompanying order purported to deny on the
merits Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend
their complaints, and to deny as moot their
motion to modify the February 12 judgment.
As a technical matter, the District Court
lacked authority to rule on the merits of the
Rule 15(a) motion because it did not modify
its final judgment dismissing those cases.

A.

Because the District Court's denial of the
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion as moot was
based on its conclusion that amendment of
the complaints would be futile, see NAC II, 7
F.Supp.3d at 54, we review the decision
below as a denial on the merits of the motion
to modify the judgment. On this question, we
look for abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion necessarily occurs when a district
court misapprehends the underlying
substantive law, and we examine the
underlying substantive law de novo. In other
words, the District Court's futility conclusion
turned on a legal determination—here, the
sufficiency of the proposed amended
complaints under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule
12(b)(6)—and we review those legal
determinations independently of the District
Court.
That brings us to the substantive questions we
must decide. We look first, as always, at the
question of whether the Plaintiffs have
standing and second, whether the Plaintiffs'

The District Court determined that the
Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because
their allegations showed neither injury nor
redressability. To establish standing, a
plaintiff must show that (i) it has “suffered a
concrete and particularized injury in fact, (ii)
that was caused by or is fairly traceable to the
actions of the defendant, and (iii) is capable
of resolution and likely to be redressed by
judicial decision.”
Plaintiffs contend that “in the absence of the
access fee rules, ATM operators would offer
consumers differentiated access fees at the
point of transaction, consumers would then
demand multi-bug PIN cards from their
banks, their banks would provide these cards,
and the market for network services would
become more competitive, all resulting in
more choice of networks and lower access
fees for consumers.” The District Court held
that this was an “attenuated, speculative
chain of events[ ] that relies on numerous
independent actors, including the PIN card
issuing banks.” We disagree, and we think
the District Court was demanding proof of an
economic theory that was not required in a
complaint.
A plaintiff's burden to demonstrate standing
grows heavier at each stage of the litigation.
Thus, “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we presum [e] that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support the claim.”
Two distinct theories of injury are relevant in
this appeal. First is the ATM operators'
theory of harm. The operators allege that
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MasterCard and Visa, working in concert
with the member banks, have maximized
their own returns on each transaction, thereby
minimizing the independent ATM operators'
cut. According to the operators, in a
competitive market, the imbalance between
low- and high-cost networks “would be
corrected by a price differential for the final
service, and consumers would respond to
lower prices for a fungible service by
switching.” But while ATM operators can
respond by routing transactions on multibugged cards over the lowest priced
networks, they are prevented from using
differential pricing to incentivize customers
to use such cards. As the operator plaintiffs
put it, “ATM operators are prohibited from
setting the price differential needed to
encourage consumers to switch.” Visa and
MasterCard are thereby insulated from
competition with other networks and can
charge supra-competitive network services
fees with impunity.
The consumers' theory of harm complements
that of the operators. The consumers allege
that they pay inflated access fees when they
visit ATMs. They believe that the Access Fee
Rules inhibit competition in both the network
services market and the market for ATM
access fees. But for the Rules, some ATM
operators would offer discounted access fees
for cards linked to lower-cost ATM
networks, and this discounting would create
downward pressure on access fees generally.
Economic harm, such as that alleged here, “is
a classic form of injury-in-fact.” But the
Defendants painted Plaintiffs' allegations as
speculative and conclusory, and the District
Court agreed. The District Court reasoned
that the “protracted chain of causation”
alleged by Plaintiffs “fails both because of
the uncertainty of several individual links and
because of the number of speculative links
that must hold for the chain to connect the

challenged acts to the asserted particularized
injury.” This was error.
At the pleadings stage, a court “must accept
as true all material allegations of the
complaint,” an obligation that we have
recognized “might appear to be in tension
with the Court's further admonition that an
allegation of injury or of redressability that is
too speculative will not suffice to invoke the
federal judicial power.” But “this ostensible
tension is reconciled by distinguishing
allegations of facts, either historical or
otherwise demonstrable, from allegations
that are really predictions.” Thus, “[w]hen
considering any chain of allegations for
standing purposes, we may reject as overly
speculative ... those types of allegations that
are not normally susceptible of labelling as
‘true’ or ‘false.’ ”
Plaintiffs' theories here are susceptible to
proof at trial. The Plaintiffs allege a system in
which Visa and MasterCard insulate their
networks from price competition from other
networks. This insulation yields higher
profits for Visa and MasterCard (and higher
returns for their shareholders), at the cost of
consumers and independent ATM operators.
The economic injury alleged is present and
ongoing.
Moreover, the complaints contain factual
details, including details about the Plaintiffs'
own conduct, that support the alleged causal
link between the Access Fee Rules and the
economic harm. According to the Plaintiffs,
Visa and MasterCard currently capture over
half of all ATM transactions, despite
charging higher fees than rival networks.
Plaintiffs further allege that independent
ATM operators (such as the operator
plaintiffs) have the desire and technical
capacity to offer discounts on cards linked to
low-cost networks. They contend that
consumers, such as Stoumbos and the Osborn
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plaintiffs, are “sensitive to differences in
ATM Access Fees and where possible will
seek out ATMs with the lowest Access Fees.”
To be certain, Plaintiffs also rely on certain
economic assumptions about supply and
demand: that other consumers besides the
Plaintiffs are price conscious; that bank
operators will respond to consumer demand
for cards tied to low-cost networks; and that
in the face of competitive pressure, ATM
networks will reduce their network fees. But
these sorts of assumptions are provable at
trial. Indeed, allegations of economic harm
“based on standard principles of ‘supply and
demand’ ” are “routinely credited by courts
in a variety of contexts.”
In deciding that the Plaintiffs had failed to
establish injury and redressability, the
District Court relied on cases that had been
decided at summary judgment. On a motion
for summary judgment by a defendant, the
question is not whether the plaintiff has
asserted a plausible theory of harm, but rather
whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that its theory is correct. A Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, however, is not the occasion for
evaluating the empirical accuracy of an
economic theory. Because the economic facts
alleged by the Plaintiffs are specific,
plausible, and susceptible to proof at trial,
they pass muster for standing purposes at the
pleadings stage.
B.
We next turn to the District Court's
alternative holding that the Plaintiffs failed to
plead adequate facts to establish the existence
of concerted activity. Under the familiar
Twombly–Iqbal standard, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.' ”

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any
“contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce.” Thus, to
make out a claim under this section, the
Plaintiffs must allege that “the challenged
anticompetitive conduct stems from ... an
agreement, tacit or express.” If such an
agreement is among competitors, we refer to
it as a horizontal restraint. The complaints are
sufficient if they contain “enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made.” We conclude that the
Plaintiffs have alleged a horizontal
agreement to restrain trade that suffices at the
pleadings stage.
According to the Plaintiffs, the member
banks developed and adopted the Access Fee
Rules when the banks controlled Visa and
MasterCard. The rules served several
purposes. First and foremost, the rules
protected Visa and MasterCard from
competition with lower-cost ATM networks,
thereby permitting Visa and MasterCard to
charge supra-competitive fees. The rules also
benefited the banks, who were equity
shareholders of the associations (and
therefore financial beneficiaries of the deal).
And the rules protected banks from
competition with each other over the types of
bugs offered on bank cards.
That the rules were adopted by Visa and
MasterCard as single entities does not
preclude a finding of concerted action. The
Supreme Court has “long held that concerted
action under [Section] 1 does not turn simply
on whether the parties involved are legally
distinct entities,” but rather depends upon “a
functional consideration of how the parties
involved in the alleged anticompetitive
conduct actually operate.” Thus, “a legally
single entity violate[s] [Section] 1 when the
entity [i]s controlled by a group of
competitors and serve[s], in essence, as a
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.”
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The allegations here—that a group of retail
banks fixed an element of access fee pricing
through bankcard association rules—
describe the sort of concerted action
necessary to make out a Section 1 claim.
Indeed, in 2003 the Second Circuit upheld a
trial court's finding that rules adopted by Visa
and MasterCard that prohibited member
banks from issuing American Express or
Discover cards violated Section 1 of the Act.
The Defendants correctly observe that
“[m]ere membership in associations is not
enough to establish participation in a
conspiracy with other members of those
associations.” But the Plaintiffs here have
done much more than allege “mere
membership.” They have alleged that the
member banks used the bankcard
associations to adopt and enforce a
supracompetitive pricing regime for ATM
access fees. That is enough to satisfy the
plausibility standard.
Defendants next seek refuge in the fact that
the banks reorganized MasterCard and Visa
as publicly held corporations in 2006 and
2008, respectively. The Defendants contend
that even if there had been agreements or
conspiracies, the public offerings terminated
them. In their view, the offering constituted a
withdrawal by the member banks—and with
that withdrawal, the cessation of any
concerted action. The Rules that remained
intact no longer represented an agreement by
the member banks, but rather unilateral
impositions by the bankcard associations
themselves, over which the banks no longer
had control.
To establish withdrawal, a defendant may
show that it has taken “[a]ffirmative acts
inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy
and communicated in a manner reasonably
calculated to reach co-conspirators.” Even
where a member of the conspiracy appears to

sever ties with other co-conspirators, there is
no withdrawal if that member continues to
support or benefit from the agreement.
Whether there was an effective withdrawal is
typically a question of fact for the jury.
According to the complaints, each member
bank “knew and understood that it and each
and every other member of the applicable
network would agree or continue to agree to
be bound” by the rules both before and after
the public offerings. To support that
allegation, the plaintiffs point out that the
banks have continued to issue Visa- and
MasterCard-branded cards and to comply
with the Access Fee Rules at their own
ATMs. Furthermore, even though the banks
no longer directly control Visa and
MasterCard, the plaintiffs observe, the banks
work with those associations to route more
transactions over their networks. For
example, at least some member banks offer
single-bug cards so that independent ATM
operators have no choice but to run those
transactions over a high-cost network run by
Visa or MasterCard. Based on these
allegations, a jury could no doubt conclude
that, in so doing, the banks continue to protect
Visa and MasterCard from price competition.
Plaintiffs also allege that several member
banks continue to benefit indirectly from the
Access Fee Rules. Because the major banks
still own shares in Visa and MasterCard, it
can be inferred that the banks reap some
ongoing financial benefit from increased
profits at Visa and MasterCard. And by
removing any incentive for customers to
demand multi-bugged debit cards, the banks
are able to avoid competition with each other
on network offerings attached to their cards.
We therefore reject the Defendants' assertion
that the public offerings dispelled any hint of
conspiracy. The Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged an agreement that originated when
the member banks owned and operated Visa
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and MasterCard and which continued even
after the public offerings of those
associations.

decline Defendants' invitation to affirm on
that basis.
III.

In a final attempt to defeat the proposed
complaints, the Defendants contend that even
if the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded
standing and agreement, they have failed to
state a claim because their allegations do not
establish antitrust injury. The Defendants do
not provide a meaningful argument as to why
antitrust standing is not present here, where
the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Access Fee
Rules chill competition among network
service providers, leading to artificially high
access fees for consumers and artificially low
margins for the ATM operators. We therefore

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
District Court erred in concluding that the
Plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to
establish standing or the existence of a
horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade. We
therefore vacate the District Court's
December 19 order denying the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend the judgment, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
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“Supreme Court agrees to review ATM fee antitrust lawsuit”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed
to hear appeals by Visa Inc, Mastercard Inc
and several U.S. banks seeking to throw out
lawsuits claiming they conspired to inflate
the prices of ATM access fees in violation of
antitrust law.
The high court will hear the companies' bid
to overturn an August 2015 ruling by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that revived three related class action
lawsuits.
The appeals court said a district court erred
when it concluded that consumers had no
standing to sue and had not adequately
alleged antitrust violations. It remanded the
three consolidated lawsuits to the district
court for further proceedings.

The rules also benefited major banks, which
were equity shareholders of Visa and
Mastercard, the lawsuits said.
The lawsuits seek damages for consumers
and ATM operators for violations of antitrust
law.
The lawsuits said that the banks controlled
Visa and MasterCard and set higher ATM
charges before the credit card companies
went public in 2008 and 2006, respectively.
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments
and issue a ruling in its next term, which
starts in October and ends in June 2017.

The decision revived two class action suits
brought by consumers and another one
brought by independent ATM operators.
Their lawsuits accused Visa and MasterCard
of adopting rules protecting themselves from
competition with a lower-cost ATM network.
The rules blocked ATM operators from
charging less when ATM transactions were
processed by networks competing with Visa
and Mastercard, the lawsuits said.
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Antitrust Case Over ATM Fees”
The National Law Journal
Zoe Tillman
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed
to hear an antitrust case that accuses Visa
Inc., MasterCard Inc. and three major
banks—Bank of America, Chase and Wells
Fargo—of conspiring to inflate ATM access
fees.
Operators and users of independent ATM
machines claim Visa and MasterCard, which
run ATM networks, and the banks illegally
control how much the ATM operators charge
consumers for access. The plaintiffs say that
the defendants conspired to adopt and
enforce rules that prevent operators from
charging consumers lower fees for getting
cash via competitor ATM networks.
The case was dismissed in 2013 but was
revived last year by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit. The appeals court found
that the plaintiffs met the standard for
pleading antitrust claims over the banks' and
networks' roles in setting ATM fee rules.
The banks and networks argued in their
petition to the Supreme Court in January that
the D.C. Circuit's decision would make
participation in a business membership
association — in this case, the bankcard
associations that banks joined to be part of
Visa and MasterCard's ATM networks — a
violation of federal antitrust law.

"If firms that participate in business
associations must incur the burden of
defending costly antitrust litigation and
discovery on mere allegations like these, the
antitrust laws will become a substantial
deterrent to the use of this procompetitive
form of business organization," the financial
institutions wrote.
The case concerns independent ATM
machines that aren't affiliated with a
particular bank. Visa and MasterCard operate
the most popular networks that connect
independent ATMs to cardholders' bank
accounts so that they can withdraw cash. At
issue is how much the operators charge
consumers to get cash via Visa and
MasterCard networks, as compared to rival
networks.
The ATM operators and users claimed that
Visa, MasterCard and the banks conspired to
keep their fees high by barring operators from
charging lower service fees for consumers'
access to less expensive networks. The
operators said those rules deprived them of
the opportunity to attract consumers who use
the cheaper rival networks.
Three lawsuits filed by operators and users
were consolidated before U.S. District Judge
Amy Berman Jackson of the District of
Columbia. She dismissed the cases in 2013,
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finding that the claims of economic injury
were too speculative and that the plaintiffs
failed to show how membership in the
bankcard associations amounted to collusion
under federal antitrust law.
The D.C. Circuit reversed Jackson in August.
Judge Robert Wilkins, writing for a threejudge panel, said that Jackson demanded a
"proof of economic theory" that wasn't
required at that stage of the litigation. On the
antitrust claims, Wilkins wrote that the
plaintiffs did more than just allege that the
banks were part of a membership association.
"They have alleged that the member banks
used the bankcard associations to adopt and
enforce a supracompetitive pricing regime
for ATM access fees," Wilkins wrote. "That
is enough to satisfy the plausibility standard."
The membership associations no longer exist,
since Visa and MasterCard went public in
2006 and 2008, respectively, and were no
longer owned by a group of banks. But the
plaintiffs claim the banks continued to hold
interests in Visa and MasterCard and that the
ATM fee rules did not change after the public
offering.

The operators and users said their case was
different because, as Wilkins wrote, they
alleged more than just membership as the
basis for the conspiracy.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
partner Boris Bershteyn, a lead counsel for
the banks and networks, declined to
comment. Skadden represents Chase; Arnold
& Porter represents Visa; Morrison &
Foerster represents Bank of America;
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler represents
Wells Fargo; and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison represents MasterCard.
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro managing
partner Steve Berman, a lead attorney for the
plaintiffs, said in an email that he was
surprised the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case but was "confident we will win."
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan also
represents the operators and users.

The banks and networks said in their cert
petition that the D.C. Circuit's decision
conflicted with a 2008 ruling by the Ninth
Circuit that rejected an antitrust class action
against Visa, MasterCard and banks over
merchant discount and credit card
interchange fees. The Ninth Circuit held in
Kendall v. Visa that membership in an
association and adopting the rules of a
particular consortium wasn't enough to make
out antitrust claims.

98

“Judge Reinstates ATM Antitrust Case Against Visa, MasterCard”
The Wall Street Journal
Angela Chen
August 4, 2015

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals on Tuesday reinstated an antitrust
lawsuit brought against Visa Inc. and
MasterCard Inc. by a trade association of
ATM operators.
Representatives for the two payment-card
networks weren’t immediately available for
comment.
Consumers, independent ATM operators and
the National ATM Council filed the lawsuit
in 2011. They alleged Visa’s and
MasterCard’s ATM-fee policies suppressed
competition because they barred ATM
operators from offering discounts to
customers who complete transactions over
less-costly payment networks.
In 2013, a fedral judge in a 39-page ruling,
found several problems with the lawsuits and
dismissed them.

“The complaints bristle with indignation, but
when one strips away the conclusory
assertions and the inferences proffered
without factual support, there is very little left
to consider,” wrote Judge Amy Berman
Jackson at the time.
In reversing the dismissal, the D.C. appellate
court ruled that there were grounds for a case
because Visa and MasterCard “member
banks used the bank associations to adopt and
enforce a supracompetitive pricing regime
for ATM access fees,” which then made the
networks more expensive for ATM operators
and consumers to use.
The lawsuit seeks damages against Visa and
MasterCard and asks the court to prevent
Visa and MasterCard from continuing to
restrict how operators charge ATM access
fee.
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National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.
15-1251
Ruling Below: SW Gen., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
Question Presented: Whether the precondition in 5 U.S.C. 3345(b)(1) on service in an acting
capacity by a person nominated by the President to fill the office on a permanent basis, requiring
that a person who is nominated to fill a vacant office that is subject to the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act may not perform the office’s functions and duties in an acting capacity unless the
person served as first assistant to the vacant office for at least 90 days in the year preceding the
vacancy, applies only to first assistants who take office under subsection (a)(1) of 5 U.S.C. 3345,
or whether it also limits acting service by officials who assume acting responsibilities under
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).

SW GENERAL, INC., doing business as Southwest Ambulance, Petitioner
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on August 7, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]

This case involves a labor dispute between an
ambulance company and its employees. We
do not reach the merits of that dispute,
however, because we conclude that Lafe
Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), served in violation of the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998
(FVRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq.
Accordingly, the unfair labor practice (ULP)
complaint issued against the ambulance
company was unauthorized. We grant the
petition for review, deny the crossapplication for enforcement and vacate the
Board's order.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Vacancy Statutes
The FVRA is a response to what Chief Justice
John Marshall called “the various crises of
human affairs”—problems that arise when
our Constitution confronts the realities of
practical governance. Specifically, the
Appointments Clause generally requires
“Officers of the United States” to be
nominated by the President “by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Advice
and consent is “more than a matter of
etiquette or protocol”; it is a “structural
safeguard[ ]” intended to “curb Executive
abuses of the appointment power” and to
“promote a judicious choice of persons for
filling the offices of the union.” But
vacancies can occur unexpectedly (due to
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death, resignation, illness, etc.) and the
confirmation process takes time. To keep the
federal bureaucracy humming, the President
needs the power to appoint acting officers
who can serve on a temporary basis without
first obtaining the Senate's blessing.
Since the “beginning of the nation,” the
Congress has given the President this power
through vacancy statutes. The predecessor to
the FVRA, the Vacancies Act, was first
enacted in 1868. The Vacancies Act allowed
the President to fill vacancies with temporary
acting officers, subject to limitations on
whom he could appoint and how long the
appointee could serve.
Presidents, however, have not always
complied with the Vacancies Act. By 1998,
an estimated 20% of all officers in positions
requiring presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation (PAS positions) were serving in
a temporary acting capacity, many well
beyond the time limits prescribed in the
Vacancies Act. Nor was the Vacancies Act
particularly
amenable
to
judicial
enforcement. In Doolin, for example, we did
not decide whether the acting director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision lacked statutory
authority because we determined that any
error in his appointment was cured. We relied
on the doctrine of ratification: because the
director's decision was later approved by a
properly appointed director, any defect in his
appointment was immaterial. Our decision in
Doolin, along with the President's
appointment of Bill Lann Lee to be Acting
Attorney General of Civil Rights in 1997,
prompted congressional action.
In June 1998, Senators Fred Thompson,
Robert Byrd, Strom Thurmond and others
introduced the FVRA to strengthen, and
ultimately replace, the Vacancies Act. The
statute was framed as a reclamation of the
Congress's Appointments Clause power.

After some amendment, the FVRA was
enacted in October 1998.
The FVRA provides that, in the event of a
vacancy in a PAS position, the “first
assistant” automatically takes over in an
acting capacity. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). The
President can also choose to appoint a senior
employee from the same agency or a PAS
officer from another agency to serve as the
acting officer. Generally speaking, an acting
officer can serve no longer than 210 days and
cannot become the permanent nominee for
the position. Moreover, in response to
Doolin, the FVRA renders actions taken by
persons serving in violation of the Act void
ab initio.
B. NLRB General Counsel Vacancy
Under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the General Counsel of the NLRB
must be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. He is
primarily responsible for prosecuting ULP
cases before the Board. Indeed, the Board
cannot adjudicate a ULP dispute until the
General Counsel decides a charge has merit
and issues a formal complaint. To manage the
volume of ULP charges filed each year, the
General Counsel has delegated his authority
to investigate charges and issue complaints to
thirty-two regional directors. The General
Counsel, however, retains “final authority”
over charges and complaints and exercises
“general supervision” of the regional
directors.
In June 2010, Ronald Meisburg resigned as
NLRB General Counsel. The President
directed Lafe Solomon, then—Director of the
NLRB's Office of Representation Appeals, to
serve as the Acting General Counsel in
Meisburg's stead. The President cited the
FVRA as the authority for Solomon's
appointment. On January 5, 2011—six
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months
into
Solomon's
temporary
appointment—the President nominated him
to be General Counsel. The Senate, however,
returned Solomon's nomination. The
President resubmitted Solomon's nomination
on May 24, 2013, but ultimately withdrew it
and nominated Richard Griffin instead, who
was confirmed by the Senate on October 29,
2013. All told, Solomon served as Acting
General Counsel from June 21, 2010 to
November 4, 2013.
C. Board Proceedings Against Southwest
SW General, Inc. (Southwest) provides
ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona.
Its emergency medical technicians, nurses
and paramedics are represented by the
International Association of Fire Fighters
Local I–60, AFL–CIO (Union). The most
recent collective bargaining agreement
between Southwest and the Union contained
a “Longevity Pay” provision, guaranteeing
annual bonuses to Southwest employees who
had been with the company for at least ten
years. In December 2012—after the
collective bargaining agreement expired but
before the parties negotiated a replacement—
Southwest stopped paying the longevity
bonuses.
The Union immediately filed a ULP charge
with the NLRB. Regional Director Cornele
Overstreet issued a formal complaint on
January 31, 2013, alleging that Southwest
had unilaterally discontinued longevity
payments in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. After a hearing, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that
Southwest had committed a ULP. Southwest
filed fifteen exceptions to the ALJ's decision,
the second of which challenged the ULP
complaint on the ground that Acting General
Counsel Solomon was serving in violation of
the FVRA. In May 2014, the NLRB adopted
the ALJ's recommended order with only

minor modifications and it did not address
Southwest's FVRA challenge.
Southwest petitioned this Court for review
and the Board cross-petitioned for
enforcement. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), (e).
II. ANALYSIS
Southwest maintains that, as of January 2011,
Acting General Counsel Solomon was
serving in violation of the FVRA and, thus,
the ULP complaint issued against it in
January 2013 was invalid. Specifically,
Southwest argues that Solomon became
ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel
once the President nominated him to be
General Counsel. In its original brief, the
Board vigorously contested Southwest's
reading of the statute but made no
argument—except in a lone footnote—about
the consequences of an FVRA violation. We
therefore asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing whether an
FVRA violation, assuming one occurred,
would nonetheless be harmless error. With
the benefit of the parties' arguments, we now
conclude that (A) Solomon was serving in
violation of the FVRA when the complaint
issued against Southwest and (B) the
violation requires us to vacate the Board's
order.
A.
The key provision of the FVRA, for present
purposes, is section 3345. For ease of
reference, we quote the provision in full:
§ 3345. Acting officer
(a) If an officer of an Executive
agency (including the Executive
Office of the President, and other than
the Government Accountability
Office) whose appointment to office
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is required to be made by the
President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or
is otherwise unable to perform the
functions and duties of the office—
(1) the first assistant to the office of
such officer shall perform the
functions and duties of the office
temporarily in an acting capacity
subject to the time limitations of
section 3346;
(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the
President (and only the President)
may direct a person who serves in an
office for which appointment is
required to be made by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to perform the functions
and duties of the vacant office
temporarily in an acting capacity
subject to the time limitations of
section 3346; or
(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the
President (and only the President)
may direct an officer or employee of
such Executive agency to perform the
functions and duties of the vacant
office temporarily in an acting
capacity, subject to the time
limitations of section 3346, if—
(A) during the 365–day period
preceding the date of death,
resignation, or beginning of inability
to serve of the applicable officer, the
officer or employee served in a
position in such agency for not less
than 90 days; and
(B) the rate of pay for the position
described under subparagraph (A) is
equal to or greater than the minimum
rate of pay payable for a position at
GS–15 of the General Schedule.
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection
(a)(1), a person may not serve as an
acting officer for an office under this
section, if—

(A) during the 365–day period
preceding the date of the death,
resignation, or beginning of inability
to serve, such person—
(i) did not serve in the position of first
assistant to the office of such officer;
or
(ii) served in the position of first
assistant to the office of such officer
for less than 90 days; and
(B) the President submits a
nomination of such person to the
Senate for appointment to such office.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to
any person if—
(A) such person is serving as the first
assistant to the office of an officer
described under subsection (a);
(B) the office of such first assistant is
an office for which appointment is
required to be made by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate; and
(C) the Senate has approved the
appointment of such person to such
office.
(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection
(a)(1), the President (and only the
President) may direct an officer who
is nominated by the President for
reappointment for an additional term
to the same office in an Executive
department without a break in
service, to continue to serve in that
office subject to the time limitations
in section 3346, until such time as the
Senate has acted to confirm or reject
the nomination, notwithstanding
adjournment sine die.
(2) For purposes of this section and
sections 3346, 3347, 3348, 3349,
3349a, and 3349d, the expiration of a
term of office is an inability to
perform the functions and duties of
such office.
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Solomon became Acting General Counsel
pursuant to subsection (a)(3)—the senior
agency employee provision. As the Director
of the Office of Representation Appeals for
the previous ten years, Solomon easily met
the salary and experience requirements of
that subsection. According to Southwest,
however, Solomon could no longer serve as
Acting General Counsel once the President
nominated him in January 2011 to be General
Counsel. Subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA
prohibits a person from being both the acting
officer and the permanent nominee unless (1)
he served as the first assistant to the office in
question for at least 90 of the last 365 days or
(2) he was confirmed by the Senate to be the
first assistant. Solomon was never a first
assistant at all so the exceptions plainly do
not apply to him. The Board, however,
contends that the prohibition in subsection
(b)(1) governs only an acting officer who
assumes the position pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), not an acting officer who is directed to
serve by the President pursuant to
subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3). Thus, the pivotal
question is whether the prohibition in
subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting
officers, as Southwest contends, or just first
assistants who become acting officers by
virtue of subsection (a)(1), as the Board
contends. Considering this question de novo,
we think Southwest has the better argument.
The first independent clause of subsection
(b)(1) is the clearest indication of its overall
scope. That clause states that “a person may
not serve as an acting officer for an office
under this section.” The term “a person” is
broad; it covers the full spectrum of possible
candidates for acting officer. And the phrase
“this section” plainly refers to section 3345 in
its entirety. Throughout the FVRA, the
Congress was precise in its use of internal
cross-references. If the Congress had wanted
to enact the Board's understanding, it would
have said “first assistant” and “that

subsection” instead of “a person” and “this
section.” Thus, the plain language of
subsection (b)(1) manifests that no person
can serve as both the acting officer and the
permanent nominee (unless one of the
exceptions in subsections (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2)
applies).
The Board's main argument to the contrary
focuses on the first dependent clause in
subsection
(b)(1):
“Notwithstanding
subsection (a)(1).” According to the Board,
the
“notwithstanding”
clause
limits
subsection (b)(1)'s prohibition to first
assistants who become acting officers
pursuant to subsection (a)(1). There are
several flaws with this argument. For starters,
it is not what the word “notwithstanding”
means. “Notwithstanding” means “in spite
of,” not, as the Board would have it, “for
purposes of” or “with respect to.” Here, then,
the “notwithstanding” clause means “to the
extent that subsection (a)(1) deviates from
subsection
(b)(1),
subsection
(b)(1)
controls.” The Congress likely referenced
subsection (a)(1) to clarify that its
command—that the first assistant “shall”
take over as acting officer—does not
supersede the prohibition in subsection
(b)(1). But, apart from setting out an order of
operations, the “notwithstanding” clause has
no significance for the ultimate scope of
subsection (b)(1).
Context further refutes the Board's
“notwithstanding” argument. As discussed,
the
Board's
interpretation
of
“notwithstanding” is irreconcilable with the
breadth of the words “a person” and “this
section” in the remainder of the introductory
clause. Indeed, the only other time section
3345 uses the phrase “a person” is in
subsection (a)(2) and, there, the phrase is
plainly not limited to a first assistant.
Moreover, the Congress used the word
“notwithstanding” several times in section
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3345. Each time, it plainly meant “in spite of”
rather than “with respect to.” “It is a well
established rule of statutory construction that
a word is presumed to have the same meaning
in all subsections of the same statute.”
Similarly, the Congress used the phrase “For
purposes of” in subsection (c)(2), which
shows that it knew how to use limiting
language when it wanted to. The Board's
crabbed interpretation of “notwithstanding”
simply does not pass muster.
Further, the Board's reading of subsection
(b)(1)—but not Southwest's—renders other
provisions of section 3345 superfluous. In the
Board's view, subsection (b)(1) applies only
to subsection (a)(1)—the first assistant
provision. Although we do not decide its
meaning today, subsection (a)(1) may refer to
the person who is serving as first assistant
when the vacancy occurs. Under this reading,
subsection (a)(1) provides a default rule that
automatically promotes someone (the current
first assistant) to be the acting officer without
a break in service and without action by the
President. But if subsection (a)(1) refers to
the first assistant at the time of the vacancy,
then
the
condition
in
subsection
(b)(1)(A)(i)—that the person “did not serve
in the position of first assistant to the office”
in the prior 365 days—is inoperative because
the current first assistant necessarily served
as the first assistant in the previous year. If
Southwest is correct that subsection (b)(1)
applies to all acting officers, however, then
subsection (b)(1)(A)(i) is not superfluous
because many PAS officers (subsection
(a)(2)) and senior agency employees
(subsection (a)(3)) will not have served as the
first assistant in the prior year.
At oral argument, the Board argued—
consistent with a revised OLC opinion—that
subsection (a)(1) also applies to a person who
becomes first assistant after the vacancy
occurs. This interpretation, the Board

contends, gives a nonsuperfluous meaning to
subsection (b)(1)(A)(i). Yet, the Board's
interpretation faces another surplusage
problem. Section 3345(b)(2)(A) allows an
acting officer to also be the permanent
nominee if, inter alia, he “is serving as [a]
first assistant.” But the current first
assistant—whether he became first assistant
before or after the vacancy—is necessarily
serving as a first assistant. The Board's
interpretation (which reads “person” in
subsection (b) to mean “first assistant”)
creates surplusage whereas Southwest's
interpretation (which reads “person” to mean
“first assistant, PAS officer or senior agency
employee”) does not.
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its textual
arguments, the Board falls back on legislative
history and statutory purpose to support its
interpretation. Its argument needs to be quite
strong because, to repeat, the text of the
FVRA plainly supports Southwest. As we
shall see, however, the Board's argument is
anything but.
The Board first points to a floor statement by
Senator Thompson, the chief sponsor of the
FVRA. Thompson presaged the Board's
view, stating, “Under § 3345(b)(1), the
revised reference to § 3345(a)(1) means that
this subsection applies only when the acting
officer is the first assistant, and not when the
acting officer is designated by the President
pursuant to §§ 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3).”
Yet, a statement of a single Senator—even
the bill's sponsor—is only weak evidence of
congressional intent. Moreover, Thompson
was immediately contradicted by Senator
Byrd—an “original sponsor” of the FVRA.
Byrd's statement6 hewed much more closely
to the statutory text and suggested that
subsection (b)(1) applies to all categories of
acting officers. Thus, the floor statements are
a wash. And Senator Thompson's statement
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is certainly not enough to overcome the
FVRA's clear text.
The Board next cites a Senate committee
report to buttress its interpretation. The report
states that “a first assistant who has not
received Senate confirmation, but who is
nominated to fill the office permanently, can
be made the acting officer only if he has been
the first assistant for at least 180 days in the
year preceding the vacancy.” The committee
report, however, is inapposite because it
discusses a different version of the FVRA
from the one ultimately enacted. Specifically,
an earlier draft of subsection (b) provided:
(b) Notwithstanding section 3346(a)(2), a
person may not serve as an acting officer for
an office under this section, if—

way decreases the pool of people eligible to
be an acting officer; it merely decreases the
pool of people eligible to be both the acting
officer and the permanent nominee.
In short, the text of subsection (b)(1) squarely
supports Southwest's interpretation and
neither the legislative history nor the
purported goal of the FVRA helps the Board.
We therefore hold that the prohibition in
subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting
officers, no matter whether they serve
pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3).
Because Solomon was never a first assistant
and the President nominated him to be
General Counsel on January 5, 2011, the
FVRA prohibited him from serving as Acting
General Counsel from that date forward.
B.

(1) on the date of the death, resignation,
or beginning of inability to server of
the applicable officer, such person
serves in the position of first assistant
to such officer;
(2) during the 365–day period preceding
such date, such person served in the
position of first assistant to such
officer for less than 180 days; and
(3) the President submits a nomination of
such person to the Senate for
appointment to such office.
This version of subsection (b) manifestly
applies to first assistants only. But the version
ultimately enacted looks quite different. In
fact, the change in phraseology weighs
somewhat against the Board's interpretation.
Finally, the Board contends that Southwest's
interpretation of subsection (b)(1) defeats the
purpose behind subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3):
namely, “expanding the pool of potential
acting officers beyond first assistants.” But
accepting Southwest's interpretation in no

Having concluded that Solomon was serving
in violation of the FVRA when the ULP
complaint issued against Southwest, we must
now determine the consequence of that
violation. Southwest believes we must vacate
the Board's order. If the violation had
occurred in the typical federal office, we
might agree. The FVRA renders any action
taken in violation of the statute void ab initio:
section 3348(d) declares that “[a]n action
taken by any person who is not acting [in
compliance with the FVRA] shall have no
force or effect” and “may not be ratified.”
Moreover, without a valid complaint, the
Board could not find Southwest liable for a
ULP.
But this is not the typical case. Section
3348(e)(1) exempts “the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board” from
the provisions of “section [3348],” including
the void-ab-initio and no-ratification rules.
The Board contends that section 3348(e)(1)
allows it to raise arguments like harmless
error and the de facto officer doctrine. We
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therefore assume that section 3348(e)(1)
renders the actions of an improperly serving
Acting General Counsel voidable, not void,
and consider the two arguments the Board
posits in its supplemental brief. We express
no view on whether section 3348(e)(1) could
be understood more broadly to wholly
insulate the Acting General Counsel's actions
even in the event of an FVRA violation. We
similarly express no view on defenses the
Board never raised.
i. Harmless Error
We first address the “rule of prejudicial
error.” As previously discussed, we held in
Doolin that any statutory defect in the acting
director's authority was cured because a
subsequent, properly appointed director
ratified his actions. The Board does not rely
on
Doolin's
holding—understandably,
inasmuch as no properly appointed General
Counsel ratified the ULP complaint against
Southwest. The Board instead relies on a
paragraph of dicta from Doolin. In Doolin,
we analogized a complaint in an
administrative enforcement proceeding to a
grand jury indictment in a criminal
proceeding. Defects in a grand jury
indictment do not constitute reversible error,
Doolin noted, unless they “prejudiced” the
defendant. And a defect does not prejudice
the defendant if a petit jury subsequently
finds him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The same logic might apply, we postulated in
Doolin, if an agency adjudicator finds a
petitioner liable despite a defective
administrative complaint. Doolin ultimately
declined to rely on this hypothesis, however,
because the parties had not briefed it. Here,
on the other hand, the Board brings Doolin 's
dicta to the forefront and argues that the
NLRB's final order renders harmless any
defect in the ULP complaint against
Southwest.

The grand jury analogy in Doolin, like the
doctrine of harmless error generally, focuses
on the existence vel non of “prejudice[ ]” to
the petitioner. But a petitioner need not
demonstrate prejudice in the first place if the
alleged error is “structural” in nature. In the
grand jury context, for example, the
occurrence of race or sex discrimination in
the selection of grand jurors constitutes a
structural error that warrants automatic
reversal. In the agency context, we concluded
in Landry that “[i]ssues of separation of
powers” are structural errors that do not
require a showing of prejudice because “it
will often be difficult or impossible for
someone subject to a wrongly designed
scheme to show that the design—the
structure—played a causal role in his loss.”
“[D]emand for a clear causal link to a party's
harm” would frustrate the “ ‘prophylactic’ ”
goal of the separation of powers—i.e., “
‘establishing high walls and clear distinctions
because low walls and vague distinctions will
not be judicially defensible in the heat of
interbranch conflict.’ ” Landry rejected the
argument that subsequent de novo review by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission
could render harmless the fact that the ALJ
was serving in violation of the Appointments
Clause. “If the process of final de novo
review could cleanse the violation of its
harmful impact,” Landry reasoned, “then all
such arrangements would escape judicial
review.”
Southwest contends that an FVRA violation
is a structural error that cannot be rendered
harmless by subsequent de novo review. We
do not reach that question, however, because
we agree with another one of Southwest's
arguments. Specifically, the grand jury
analogy from Doolin is ill-suited in this case.
In a criminal proceeding, the grand jury and
petit jury are similarly situated and have the
same basic task: determining the defendant's
guilt under the requisite standard of proof
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(“probable cause” and “beyond a reasonable
doubt,” respectively). As such, “[a] later
conviction by a petit jury supplies virtual
certainty that a properly constituted grand
jury would have indicted.” Here, however,
we lack the same certainty. The NLRB
General Counsel is statutorily independent
from the Board, and he has “final authority”
over the issuance of ULP complaints. He
essentially exercises prosecutorial discretion:
he need not issue a complaint even if he
believes a ULP was committed. Moreover,
the General Counsel sets the enforcement
priorities for the NLRB and generally
supervises its lawyers. During oral argument,
the Board conceded that, if the General
Counsel's office were vacant, the NLRB
“would not be issuing complaints.” The
Board nonetheless argued that, because the
type of ULP charged against Southwest was
not “of substantial legal interest” to Acting
General Counsel Solomon, that particular
complaint did not require submission to the
General Counsel's Office for review
beforehand. Southwest rightly points out,
however, that a different General Counsel
may have imposed different requirements
and procedures during his tenure.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the final Board
order, we cannot be confident that the
complaint against Southwest would have
issued under an Acting General Counsel
other than Solomon. Our uncertainty is
sufficient to conclude that Southwest has
carried its burden of demonstrating that the
FVRA violation is non-harmless under the
Administrative Procedure Act. We therefore
conclude that the NLRB order did not ratify
or otherwise render harmless the FVRA
defect in the ULP complaint against
Southwest. We note, however, that our
conclusion does not control whether the
ineligibility of an official with prosecutorial
responsibilities in other contexts should be
considered harmless.

ii. De Facto Officer Doctrine
The only other argument in the Board's
supplemental brief is the de facto officer
doctrine. This oft-forgotten doctrine has
“feudal origins,” dating back to the 15th
century. The doctrine “confers validity upon
acts performed by a person acting under the
color of official title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person's
appointment or election to office is
deficient.” In its most recent cases, however,
the Supreme Court has limited the doctrine,
declining to apply it when reviewing
Appointments Clause challenges, and
important statutory defects to an adjudicator's
authority.
In its traditional form, the de facto officer
doctrine distinguishes between “direct” and
“collateral” attacks on an officer's authority.
A collateral attack challenges “government
action on the ground that the officials who
took the action were improperly in office.”
The de facto officer doctrine bars such
attacks. A direct attack, by contrast,
challenges “the qualifications of the officer,
rather than the actions taken by the officer.”
The de facto officer doctrine allows such
attacks but they can be brought via writ of
quo warranto only. To obtain quo warranto
against a federal official, an interested party
must petition the Attorney General of the
United States to institute a proceeding in
federal district court. If the Attorney General
declines, the interested party can petition the
court to issue the writ instead. Both the
Attorney General and the court, however,
have “broad discretion” to decline to make
use of quo warranto.
This Court has rejected the traditional version
of the de facto officer doctrine. Direct action
via quo warranto is too “cumbersome,” we
explained in Andrade, and “could easily
operate to deprive a plaintiff with an
108

otherwise legitimate claim of the opportunity
to have his case heard.” We disapprove of
any “interpretation of the de facto officer
doctrine that ... would render legal norms
concerning appointment and eligibility to
hold office unenforceable.” Instead, we have
held that collateral attacks on an official's
authority are permissible when two
requirements are satisfied:
First, the plaintiff must bring his
action at or around the time that the
challenged government action is
taken. Second, the plaintiff must
show that the agency or department
involved has had reasonable notice
under all the circumstances of the
claimed defect in the official's title to
office.
Both requirements are met here.
The first requirement, as stated in Andrade,
appears on its face not to fit this case. The
plaintiffs in Andrade filed a separate suit for
injunctive and declaratory relief, which
explains the Court's instruction to “bring [an]
action at or around the time the challenged
government action is taken.” Here, by
contrast, Southwest is subject to an
enforcement action brought by the NLRB. In
these circumstances, we have held, a party
satisfies the first Andrade requirement if it
challenges an officer's authority as a defense
to the enforcement action. Of course, the
ordinary rules of exhaustion and forfeiture
still apply. In the administrative proceedings
below, Southwest raised its FVRA challenge
as an exception to the ALJ decision. It
therefore complied with the NLRA's
jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. And
the Board does not assert that Southwest's
challenge was otherwise untimely or
forfeited. Thus, we assume it was properly
preserved.

Nor does the Board contest that the second
Andrade
requirement—notice—is
also
satisfied here. To meet this requirement, “the
agency ... [must] actually know[ ] of the
claimed defect.” Notice ensures that the
agency has a chance to “remedy any defects
(especially narrowly technical defects) either
before it permits invalidly appointed officials
to act or shortly thereafter.” Here, Southwest
notified the NLRB of the defect in Solomon's
authority by excepting to the ALJ decision.
The Board does not challenge the adequacy
of this notice. Moreover, the notice
requirement is satisfied if the agency learns
of the defect from any source, not only the
petitioner. The Board has not informed us
when it first became aware of Solomon's
problematic service. We therefore cannot say
that its notice of the FVRA defect was
inadequate. Accordingly, we conclude that
the de facto officer doctrine does not bar
Southwest from challenging Solomon's
authority.
Finally, we emphasize the narrowness of our
decision. We hold that the former Acting
General Counsel of the NLRB, Lafe
Solomon, served in violation of the FVRA
from January 5, 2011 to November 4, 2013.
But this case is not Son of Noel Canning and
we do not expect it to retroactively
undermine a host of NLRB decisions. We
address the FVRA objection in this case
because the petitioner raised the issue in its
exceptions to the ALJ decision as a defense
to an ongoing enforcement proceeding. We
doubt that an employer that failed to timely
raise an FVRA objection—regardless
whether enforcement proceedings are
ongoing or concluded—will enjoy the same
success.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the
petition for review, deny the crossapplication for enforcement and vacate the
NLRB order. So ordered.
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“U.S. justices to mull president's power to nominate officials”
Reuters
Robert Iafolla
June 20, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to review a lower court decision that
invalidated part of a former U.S. labor board
official’s tenure, in a case that could curb the
next president’s power to staff top positions
in his or her administration.
The justices will hear an appeal of a 2015
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit saying that once President
Barack Obama nominated Lafe Solomon in
2011 to be general counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Solomon
should not have continued to fill the position
on a temporary or "acting" basis pending
Senate confirmation.
The appeals court said a 1998 federal law
bars anyone from serving in an acting role
while they are the nominee unless they were
previously the "first assistant" to that post.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the case could
decide if the White House can temporarily fill
high-level administration positions with
nominees waiting for confirmation, which
could take on added importance if the next
president faces protracted nomination battles
in the Senate.
The case will give the Supreme Court a
second chance to weigh in on executive
branch authority related to filling positions at

the NLRB. In 2014, the court in NLRB v. Noel
Canning ruled that three 2013 appointments
Obama made to the board while Congress
was in recess were invalid.
Although Obama withdrew Solomon’s
stalled nomination in 2013, about six current
high-level officials are serving on an acting
basis while they await a Senate vote,
including officials at the Department of
Health and Human Services and the
Environmental Protection Agency, the
NLRB said in its petition for review.
Former presidents Bill Clinton and George
W. Bush also tapped officials to permanently
fill the posts that they were manning in a
temporary capacity, the NLRB said.
Clinton, Bush and Obama all relied on an
interpretation of the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act that viewed the restriction on
first assistants as only applying to people who
automatically become acting officers under a
chain of command, rather than those
nominated by the president, the NLRB said.
But the D.C. Circuit, as well as the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2016 ruling,
have disagreed.
The case is NLRB v. SW General Inc, No. 151251, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“Again, the president’s power to appoint is at issue”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
June 20, 2016

For the second time in two years, the
Supreme Court on Monday assigned itself the
task of clarifying the president’s power to fill
government posts — even as the Court awaits
a nominee to join its own ranks. The new
case — like one in 2014 — involves the
staffing of the National Labor Relations
Board. At issue this time is when the
president may name someone to perform a
high-level federal office in an “acting”
capacity, affecting many posts throughout the
bureaucracy.
In another newly granted case, the Court will
clarify the federal government’s power to
hold in detention people who have no legal
right to enter or be in the country, pending
their deportation.
Both that and the
appointments case will be heard and decided
at the Court’s next Term, starting in October.
At this point, it may be that both cases will be
heard by an eight-Justice Court, because of
the continuing uncertainty over a nominee to
succeed the late Justice Antonin Scalia.
There is no provision in federal law for
naming an “acting” Justice when there is a
vacancy.
In a third significant action on Monday, the
Court declined to consider Second
Amendment challenges to state bans on
assault weapons, in Connecticut and New

York. That echoed a similar refusal last
December to review the constitutionality of
such a ban in a Chicago suburb, Highland
Park. Turned aside this time were the
Connecticut case of Shew v. Malloy and the
New York case of Kampfer v. Cuomo. No
Justice noted a dissent from either denial.
Justice Clarence Thomas had dissented when
the Court passed up the issue in December;
he was joined at that time by Scalia.
In addition, the Court asked for the federal
government’s view on whether it should hear
two new patent disputes. The combined
cases of Amgen v. Sandoz and Sandoz v.
Amgen grow out of a decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
adding more time to the supposedly
abbreviated process of government approval
of the marketing of “biosimilars” — that is,
products that are similar to existing biologics,
now a major source of new products for
medical treatment. In the case of Impression
Products v. Lexmark International, a dispute
over the sale of refilled toner cartridges for
computer printers raises the issue of when a
patent holder loses exclusive rights after the
item has been sold, if post-sale restrictions
have been imposed. There is no time limit for
the U.S. Solicitor General to offer the
government’s views.
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The new dispute over presidential
appointment powers — NLRB v. SW
General Inc. — revolves around the meaning
of a federal law that was passed in 1998 in a
move by Congress to curb the use of “acting”
appointments to fill spots in government
offices without going through the Senate
confirmation process.
There is no
constitutional issue involved this time, as
there was in 2014 when the Court ruled in
NLRB v. Noel Canning that the president has
limited authority under the Constitution to fill
a government position when the Senate was
in recess and thus unable to act on a nominee.
Congress has been controlling the authority
of the president to fill vacancies since it first
passed a law on that subject in 1898. The
lawmakers decided to put new limits on that
authority in 1998; at that time, one out of
every five officials whose job required
presidential
nomination
and
Senate
confirmation were serving in an “acting”
capacity well beyond the time limits
specified in the 1898 law.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act was
passed to reclaim the Senate’s role on filling
vacancies to high-level government posts. At
issue in the new NLRB case is the scope of
presidential authority to give someone an
“acting” assignment if the president has
nominated that person to the position but the
Senate has not yet acted. The dispute
involves President Obama’s appointment of
an “acting” general counsel of the NLRB.
The general counsel has the final authority to
issue complaints of unfair labor practices in
management-labor dealings.

SW General Inc., which operates ambulance
services in Arizona, challenged a decision
that it had committed an unfair labor practice
in ending a system of annual bonuses for
emergency
technicians,
nurses,
and
paramedics. The board’s action was illegal
because the case was initiated by an “acting”
general counsel whom the president did not
have the power to appoint, the company
contended.
The Supreme Court will act on the question
of presidential power without ruling on the
particular unfair labor practice case that gave
rise to that question.
In the other case in which the Court granted
review on Monday, Jennings v. Rodriguez,
the Court is being asked by the federal
government to reinforce its authority to hold
foreign nationals in detention while the issue
of deportation is under review. The specific
issue is whether the government must hold a
hearing, at which a foreign national may seek
release, every six months for all people held
in detention after entering or being in the
country without legal permission.
In taking that question to the Court, the
Justice Department contended that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
“replaced the carefully tailored regime [for
detention of illegal foreign nationals] with a
rigid, one-size-fits-all rule that every alien in
detention” must be given a release hearing
automatically every six months.
That
approach, the department contended, will
jeopardize its authority to hold those who
have committed crimes or acts of terrorism.

Contents of the article, broken into two
separate columns, like so
112

“D.C. Circuit Court Invalidates Solomon’s Appointment As Acting
NLRB General Counsel– What Does It Mean?”
The National Law Review
Peter M. Panken
August 13, 2015

On August 7, in SW General Inc. v. NLRB
2015 US App LEXIS 13812, a federal
appellate court ruled that the January 5, 2011
appointment of Lafe Solomon as Acting
General Counsel to the NLRB violated the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act 5 U.S.C.
Sections 3345 et. seq. (FVRA) (PDF). For
that reasons it held that his authorizations to
issue an unfair labor practice (“ULP”)
complaint in the case was invalid and the
NLRB’s decision finding the employer guilty
of ULPs must be vacated. Since Solomon
served as Acting General Counsel until
November 4, 2013, the Court’s decision
renders potentially suspect any and all NLRB
ULP decisions based upon complaints issued
during that period.
Noel Canning
In NLRB v. Noel Canning 134 S. Ct. 2550
(2014) the Supreme Court invalidated a
plethora of NLRB decisions based on its
finding that the appointments of Board
members who had participated in the
decisions were invalid recess appointments
because the Court found that the Senate was
not in fact in recess at the time the
appointments were made. In the wake of
Noel Canning, the Board, then composed of
members whose appointments had been

properly confirmed by the Senate
reconsidered and reissued most of those
decisions. SW General seems to be another
decision invalidating a scheme by the
Administration to get around Senate
roadblocks to appointments which has been
invalidated by the Courts.
The Impact of SW General
But the Court in SW General made clear that
its holding in that case would actually be
much narrower in its impact. That is because
it held that if an employer had not timely
raised the issue of the General Counsel’s
appointment, the defense was waived:
We hold that the former Acting
General Counsel of the NLRB, Lafe
Solomon, served in violation of the
FVRA from January 5, 2011 to
November 4, 2013. But this case is
not Son of Noel Canning and we do
not expect it to retroactively
undermine a host of NLRB decisions.
We address the FVRA objection in
this case because the petitioner raised
the issue in its exceptions to the ALJ
decision as a defense to an ongoing
enforcement proceeding. We doubt
that an employer that failed to timely
113

raise an FVRA objection—regardless
whether enforcement proceedings are
ongoing or concluded—will enjoy the
same success. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e);
Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1499.
In SW General, the defense was raised in
exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge’s decision. Whether it can be raised
after the decision by the NLRB is
questionable.
29 U.S.C. Sec 160 (e)
specifically provides: No objection that has
not been urged before the Board, its member,
agent, or agency, shall be considered by the
court, unless the failure or neglect to urge
such objection shall be excused because of
extraordinary circumstances In Andrade v.
Lauer, 729 F2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the
DC Circuit set forth the requirements needed
to attack decisions by an invalidly appointed
official:

plaintiff. It does, however, require
that the agency or department
involved actually knows of the
claimed defect.
What This Means for Employers
Thus, employers found to have committed
unfair labor practices in proceedings between
January 5, 2011 and November 4, 2013,
during Lafe Solomon’s tenure as Acting
General Counsel should review the status of
the proceedings against them and determine
whether they are still able to raise this issue
as quickly as possible in any proceeding
which has not yet been decided by the NLRB.

The core purposes of the doctrine are
served if a plaintiff challenging
government action on the ground that
the officials taking that action
improperly hold office meets two
requirements. First, the plaintiff must
bring this action at or around the time
that the challenged government
action is taken. Second, the plaintiff
must show that the agency or
department involved has had
reasonable notice under all the
circumstances of the claimed defect
in the official’s title to office. This
does not require that the plaintiff
perform any particular rituals before
bringing suit, nor does it mandate that
the agency’s knowledge of the
alleged defect must come from the
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